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ABSTRACT 
 
The coup d’état, which in June 2009 led to the removal of Honduras’ democratically elected president 
Manuel Zelaya, has had serious consequences for the human rights situation in the country. In the post-coup 
context, gross violations of human rights have taken place, and continue to take place under the current 
president Porfirio Lobo. The present study addresses the issue of whether the Honduran Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (CVR), which was established by Lobo in January 2010, conducted an 
investigation that complied with international human rights law and standards, and whether it is likely to 
contribute to a bettering of human rights in post-coup Honduras.  
 
International human rights law instructs that states coming from a past of gross human rights violations 
must secure the right to the truth, justice, and reparation for the victims and for society as a whole. The 
study examines whether these rights have been – or are likely to be – satisfied via the truth-seeking process 
in post-coup Honduras. Furthermore, the study examines whether the CVR is likely to prevent further human 
rights violations in the future, and which role the Honduran government has played in the process. To 
address these questions, the study makes use of theoretical perspectives on truth commissions’ impact on 
human rights, and international standards for the effective functioning of truth commissions, as 
recommended by the international human rights community.  
 
In the study it is argued that a) the Honduran truth-seeking process did not live up to international human 
rights obligations or international standards for TCs, b) significant obstacles are present in Honduras that 
reduce the likeliness of the CVR making a difference for human rights in the country, and c) the Honduran 
government negatively influenced the CVR’s contribution to human rights. Based on these findings, the study 
concludes that the CVR is unlikely to contribute to an improvement of human rights in post-coup Honduras. 
Based on Grodsky’s (2007) theory of truth commissions in the context of repressive rule, the study identifies 
the Honduran government’s as the main obstacle for the advancement of human rights through the CVR, 
arguing that it launched a weak and carefully controlled “illiberal truth commission process”, aimed at 
regaining international recognition without exposing powerful elites to the risk of losing influence. Building 
from its findings on the Honduran truth-seeking process, the study recommends a more rigorous assessment 
on part of international actors pressing for, and supporting, truth commissions in the context of repressive 
rule.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In 2009 a constitutional crisis took place in Honduras, which culminated in the forced removal of the 
democratically elected president Manuel Zelaya. This coup d’état has had serious consequences for the 
country and its population. The present study addresses the human rights violations and the truth-seeking 
efforts that have taken place in Honduras since the coup. More specifically, it addresses the issue of whether 
the Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR for its Spanish acronym), which was established 
in 2010, conducted an investigation that complied with international human rights law and standards, and 
whether it is likely to contribute to a bettering of human rights in post-coup Honduras.  
 
In this introductory chapter I will account for the problem area of the study. I take my starting point in 
introducing the field of transitional justice and truth commissions (TCs), and clarifying central concepts. 
Subsequently, I introduce the CVR and the context in which it was created. Hereafter, I introduce the 
purpose of the study, and narrow down the problem to a specific research question, which I then elaborate 
through working questions and hypotheses, and an outlining of the structure of the study. Subsequently, I 
present the theoretical and methodological foundation that will enable me to analyze and make conclusions 
about the truth-seeking process in Honduras.  
 
1.1 Problem Area 
 
1.1.1 The Field of Truth Commissions and Transitional Justice  
  
“While the truth is painful, burying the past is much less likely to lead a country to a healthy future” 
(Kofi Annan in Hayner 2011: xiv) 
 
How does a society move past the wounds inflicted by past violence and human rights abuses, and avoid the 
recurrence of such abuses in the future? In the last 30 years, with the advent of transitional justice 
approaches, this question has received considerable attention among scholars and human rights defenders 
alike. Countries are confronting serious challenges in different types of political transition periods; 
challenges that many argue cannot be dealt with solely via the courts.  
 
The emergence of the TC is often noted as one of the most significant human rights developments since the 
1980s (Brahm 2009: 1). A TC is a transitional justice mechanism designed to handle injustices and the 
investigations of human rights violations. TCs have primarily been created in developing countries in a 
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period of political transition from military rule, civil war, or repressive government (Hayner 2011: 7; eds. 
Rotberg & Thompson 2000: 1). The TC idea emerged in Latin America, where the first widely known TC 
was established in Argentina in 1983, and the phenomenon later spread to Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador, and 
many other Latin American countries (Shaw 2005: 2). Especially in the 1980s, when repressive regimes in 
Latin America engaged in “dirty wars”, where they developed deniable forms of repression such as 
disappearances and death squads, truth-telling became an important weapon to establish accountability and 
get public acknowledgement of the crimes committed by the state (ibid: 2), and the words “Nunca más”1 
(never again) resonated throughout the region. Not only in Latin America, but all over the world, did the end 
of many dictatorships and civil conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s lead to a trend that has continued into the 
twenty-first century (Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010: 3), and as to this day over 40 TCs have been created 
worldwide to investigate past human rights abuses. About half of these were created within the last ten years 
(Hayner 2011: xiv), demonstrating the fact that TCs are becoming an increasingly fashionable way for states 
to address their past repression, and an essential part of transitional justice efforts around the world (Grodsky 
2007: 282).  
Transitional justice, which within the last two decades has become constitutive of local, national and 
international attempts to end violence and deal with its legacies following civil war or political repression, is 
based on the belief that damages of the past may be repaired in order to produce a future characterized by 
non-recurrence of violence, rule of law, and a culture of human rights. Transitional justice refers to the “full 
range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of 
large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation” (UN 
Security Council 2004: 4). The paradigm of transitional justice is put into practice via a set of legal and 
commemorative mechanisms, i.e. prosecutions, purges of perpetrators, memorials, reparations, and of 
course, TCs (Shaw & Waldorf 2010: 3). Truth and reconciliation have become a paradigm for transitional 
politics since the 1980s, and in particular since the widely known South African experience with its Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in the 1990s, TCs have emerged as a popular transitional justice alternative 
to trials (Brahm: n.d). 
 
The aim of TCs is to deter future human rights abuses by responding to the needs and interests of victims, 
contributing to justice and accountability, outlining institutional responsibility and recommending reforms. 
TCs are non-judicial entities and are thus fundamentally different from courtroom trials, and have very 
different goals (Hayner 2002: 7). They have been referred to as peace-building tools, as the purpose of their 
work is to clarify and acknowledge the truth about past human rights abuses, by seeking national 
reconciliation and closure and to move forward (Hayner 2002: 24-31). Most have sought to investigate 
                                                      
1 "Nunca Más" was the name of the report of the earliest truth commission, the 1983 National Commission on 
Disappeared Persons in Argentina. The condensed version of the report became a national bestseller (Freeman 2005). 
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patterns of human rights abuses and analyze their causes, aiming at producing an official historical record 
and thereby to prevent the recurrence of such abuses. Some have sought to provide a therapeutic forum for 
victims, perpetrators and society as a whole to publicly discuss the abuses, often with the ultimate aim of 
reconciliation and sometimes to achieve a degree of justice (OHCHR 2006: 6). 
 
Coming to terms with a difficult past is a complex affair, which, following its recent prevalence, has received 
much attention in the scholarly debate. TCs have been referred to as a respectable third way to deal with the 
past: one that is “more responsive than blanket amnesties yet less provocative and potentially destabilizing 
than criminal prosecutions” (Grodsky 2007: 281). There is still no single, broadly accepted, definition of 
TCs; however, there seems to be considerable consensus that they should be defined in some variation of 
this: temporary, fact-finding bodies that are officially established to investigate a pattern of human rights 
abuses that occurred in a country’s past (e.g. Brahm 2009: 2-3; Hayner 2011: 11-12; UNCHR 2005: 6).  
 
TCs exist because of political compromises, but also because society is unwilling to forgive and forget 
without confronting the human rights abusers (eds. Rotberg & Thompson 2000: 7). Countries engaging in 
truth-seeking activities have come out of a wide range of repressive regimes, and emerged through very 
different types of political transitions. Consequently, TCs differ in scope, nature, composition, and purpose 
depending on the specific conflict and context, as well as the political will to address the past human rights 
abuses (Reddy 2004: 1). TCs have some common elements, such as their non-judicial investigative role, the 
types of crimes investigated, their limited timeframe, and the responsibility of the state in the investigation. 
Yet, they also differ on several aspects. Some TCs’ investigations are designed to win the attention of the 
public, yet others operate behind closed doors. Some are endowed with a broad mandate and empowerment, 
while others are deprived of powers and have a narrow mandate (Grodsky 2007: 283). Other points on which 
TCs differ are e.g. the granting of amnesty to perpetrators in return for their testimonies, and the relationship 
with criminal procedures (Kerber 2003: 152).  
 
In sum, TCs aim at achieving some or all of the following goals: discovering, clarifying, and officially 
acknowledging past abuses; addressing the needs of the victims; advancing accountability and fighting 
impunity; outlining institutional responsibility and recommending reforms; and promoting reconciliation2 
and reducing conflict and the occurrence of human rights violations (Hayner 2011: 20). To achieve their 
goals, TCs engage in a variety of activities and serve a variety of functions. On a personal level they create 
an environment where victims can tell their stories. The collection of victim data and testimony can aim both 
                                                      
2 This goal has become more pronounced in recent truth commissions, including the CVR, since the experience of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Some refer to truth commissions as truth and reconciliation 
commissions, yet I refer to them simply as truth commissions, based on the fact that the goal of reconciliation is to a 
large degree disputed. 
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at establishing an official record of past abuses, and at resolving disagreements and exposing underlying 
conflicts, in order to help ease tensions and promote reconciliation. The symbolic function of supplying a 
forum for acknowledging past abuses is often referred to as an important part of the work of TCs (Grodsky 
2007: 283). Other TC activities include the opening of state information and public archives, exhumations, 
memorials, publication of comprehensive reports, and policy recommendations (Andrieu 2010; ICTJ 2008b). 
 
In this study the focus is on the legal basis and best practices of TCs, and the impact that TCs have, or may 
have, on human rights; more specifically the impact of the CVR on human rights in Honduras. Before 
moving on to further elaborating the problem area and the purpose of the study, a few more central concepts 
deserve clarification.  
 
1.1.1.1 Clarification of Concepts 
The field of TCs is a field with many negotiated arguments, for which an understanding of essential concepts 
is necessary.  
      One is the concept of “truth”, which, while being at the essence of this thesis, is not easily defined. The 
issue of the complexity and multiplicity of truth is one of the problematics of TCs, which will be touched 
upon in the analysis. However, when referring to the truth in the thesis, it should be understood as defined in 
the dictionary: “the body of real things, events and facts” (Encyclopedia Britannica n.d.). 
      Connected to the definition of truth is the concept of “truth-seeking”, which in this thesis refers to the 
process of uncovering the truth about events that occurred in a country’s past. Truth-seeking can either be 
official or unofficial in origin. 
      As used in the thesis, the concept of “international human rights law” is defined as the law concerned 
with the protection of individuals and groups against violations of their internationally guaranteed rights, and 
the promotion of these rights. More specifically, in this thesis, “human rights” refer to the universal 
principles shared by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the regional human rights 
instrument pertaining to the Americas, the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). These rights 
are universal, inherent to all human beings, and comprise all generations of human rights: civil and political 
rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and collective rights. However, as a matter of limitation, the 
thesis will not be dealing with the second generation of human rights, i.e. economic, social and cultural 
rights.  
      In continuation of this, in the thesis, the phrase “gross/serious human rights violations/abuses/crimes” 
is defined in accordance with the following definition:  
 
(…) summary or arbitrary executions, torture, disappearances, arbitrary and prolonged detention, and 
systematic discrimination (…) [V]iolations of other human rights (…) may also be gross and systematic 
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in scope and nature (…) [L]arge-scale violations are always gross in character and gross violations of 
individuals' rights such as torture or arbitrary and prolonged detention, if unpunished, either lead to large-
scale violations or indicate that such violations are already taking place. The same may be said about 
systematic human rights violations (UN Commission on Human Rights 1999: para. 14-16). 
 
Another important concept for this study is the concept of “justice”, which is defined in accordance with the 
definition of the UN: ””Justice” is an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication 
of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs” (UN Security Council 2004: 4). Yet, as will be 
noted later in the thesis, there are different forms of justice, but when referring simply to “justice” this should 
be understood as criminal justice, cf. the definition above. 
      “Reconciliation” is another important concept, which will be dealt with in the study. The Oxford 
English Dictionary (n.d.) defines “reconcile” as “to restore (a person) to friendly relations after an 
estrangement” or “to make peace (between parties in conflict)”. In the TC literature there is some confusion 
about the meaning of the term and no across the board clear definition is available. However, it is agreed that 
one must distinguish between individual and national reconciliation. While TCs have been accredited with 
advancing national reconciliation, individual reconciliation is more complex, because it is a deeply personal 
process (Hayner 2011: 183). Hence, when referring to “reconciliation” in the study, it should be understood 
as reconciliation on a national level.  
 
1.1.2 The Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
In Honduras, a small Central American country with a history of poor human rights conditions, a TC was 
created fairly recently in the aftermath of the coup d’état that took place close to four years ago, on June 28, 
2009. The CVR was established in April 2010 by the Honduran government under president Porfirio Lobo 
with the purpose of clarifying the events that took place before and after the coup and make proposals to the 
Honduran people in order to avoid that the events are repeated (CVR 2011a), a goal that is reflected in the 
title of the commission’s final report: “Para que los hechos no se repitan” (So that the events are not 
repeated). The CVR originated from the Tegucigalpa/San José Accord and was a prerequisite for Honduras 
to be readmitted to the Organization of American States (OAS), from which it was suspended following the 
coup, and gain recognition from several governments, including the U.S. The Tegucigalpa/San José Accord 
resulted from the Guaymuras Dialogue, an OAS-led mediation effort involving representatives from both the 
ousted president Zelaya and de facto president Roberto Micheletti. It was a 12-point plan, aiming at national 
reconciliation and strengthening of Honduran democracy, which eventually failed, because the Micheletti 
government ignored point 1 and 5: the inclusion of Zelaya’s ousted government in the formation of a unity 
government, and the restoration to power of president Zelaya for the rest of his term, respectively (CCR n.d.; 
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CVR 2011a: 46). Nevertheless, the Honduran government under Micheletti and later Lobo went on to 
implement other points of the accord, including point 6, which called for the formation of a TC:  
 
With the goal of clarifying the deeds that occurred before and after the 28 of June 2009, there will also be 
created a Truth Commission that will identify the acts that led to the present situation, and provide to the 
Honduran people elements to avoid that those deeds will be repeated in the future (Tegucigalpa/San José 
Accord 2009). 
 
Upon its establishment, the CVR suffered critique from both Honduran and international human rights 
organizations for failing to comply with international standards for TCs, and not focusing enough on the 
human rights abuses that occurred in connection with the coup. The level of dissatisfaction with the CVR is 
exemplified by the fact that a confederation of international and Honduran human rights organizations, the 
Honduran Human Rights Platform, went on to establish their own civil-society TC: the AI-supported “True 
Commission” (CdV for its Spanish acronym) (Mejia 2010). There are many examples of such unofficial TCs 
being established parallel with official commissions, and some have taken on considerable proportions 
(Hayner 2011: 17).    
 
1.2 Motivation and Purpose of the Study  
Inspired by the critique set forward against the CVR by the CdV and human rights organizations, this study 
seeks to examine the truth-seeking process in Honduras to find out whether it complied with international 
human rights law and standards. The ultimate purpose is to determine how likely the CVR is to make a 
difference for human rights in Honduras. To address this purpose, the study makes use of theoretical 
perspectives on TCs: how they best conduct their investigation and their potential to contribute to human 
rights improvements. The theory is introduced in chapter 2, before being put to use in the analysis.  
 
The motivation for conducting this study stems from an ongoing involvement, both personal and 
professional, with Honduras. As a volunteer in the Danish Central America Committee (MAK for its Danish 
acronym), over the last two years, I have cooperated with a grassroots human rights organization that works 
in Northwestern Honduras. Via this partnership I was introduced to the challenges that Honduran civil 
society faces in the post-coup setting of Honduras today. Last year, in February, I visited Honduras and 
experienced first hand the severity of the situation. My primary impression was that Honduras is a country in 
crisis. The crime rates were soaring to the point that people avoided walking the streets and taking the bus 
for fear of having their rights violated in one way or the other. Every day one would hear of a new murder. 
Many were poor and unemployed, struggling to get by. Youth gangs roamed the streets and were slowly 
occupying one community after the other. People were frustrated with the pervasive impunity, and trust in 
authorities was virtually non-existent. When over 350 inmates were killed in Comayagua prison in one of the 
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world’s worst prison fires, the reactions I met were disturbing as they reflected suspicion towards a larger 
scheme to get rid of the criminals. Many expressed frustration with the government, arguing that they were 
living under a repressive regime that was deliberately violating their rights and accepting impunity and 
corruption among its state officials. Based on my observations in Honduras, I became incentivized to further 
investigate the human rights situation in Honduras. When I discovered that a TC had recently been 
established, I became intrigued with looking closer into the efforts of the CVR and the process of truth-
seeking. The idea of TCs acting as a catalyst for improved human rights conditions fascinates me. Do TCs 
really hold such power? And if so, how should they act in order to put this power to use?  
 
The topic of the Honduran CVR, its efforts and its impact, i.e. the social and political consequences of the 
truth-seeking process, has not received much attention in the scholarly debate. Based on my own 
observations that human rights are still under pressure in Honduras as well as the continued concern of the 
human rights community, I feel that it is important to deal with this particular issue. Did the CVR conduct a 
thorough investigation? Did it collect testimonies and evidence? Arrange public hearings? Is it likely to 
shape public opinion, create a culture of human rights, pressure for reform, and deter human rights abuses? 
Has it had any effect? Clearly, it is not yet possible to determine the final impact of the CVR, because it is 
still very recent, and there is a possibility for long-term effects. However, an analysis of the efforts of the 
CVR can be interesting, because it illuminates whether international standards and obligations were fulfilled, 
and makes it possible to gauge the commission’s potential to make a difference. By checking for variables 
that other studies have deemed important for TCs to have an impact on human rights conditions, it is my 
intent to assess the potential of the CVR to have a positive influence on the human rights situation in 
Honduras, and thus make a difference for Hondurans.  
 
1.3 Research Question 
This then leads to the following research question: 
 
To what extent is the Honduran Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) likely to 
contribute to an improvement of human rights in post-coup Honduras? 
 
1.3.1 Elaboration on the Research Question 
 
1.3.2 Working Questions 
In order to satisfactorily answer the research question, I will scrutinize the following working questions: 
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• What are the obligations of the Honduran state according to international human rights law, and 
what are the extent and character of the human rights violations in post-coup Honduras?  
• To what extent did the Honduran truth-seeking process comply with international human rights law 
and standards for TCs? 
• How likely is the CVR to make a difference for human rights, and which obstacles can be identified 
for this to happen?  
• How did the Honduran government influence the CVR’s contribution to human rights?  
 
1.3.3 Hypotheses 
Based on my observation that human rights are still being violated in Honduras, as well as the criticism the 
CVR has received from human right groups, I have adopted the hypothesis that the CVR has not conducted 
the truth-seeking process well enough to make a difference for human rights in the country. A further 
hypothesis, derived from the statements given to me upon my visit to Honduras, is that this is due to the 
Honduran government’s desire to repress the population and stay in power. These hypotheses will be tested 
throughout the analysis, and confirmed/refuted in the final conclusion.  
 
1.3.4 Structure and Analytical Approach of the Study  
To answer my research question, I apply the following structure: 
      In the present chapter (chapter 1) I have provided an introduction to the topic by providing background 
information as well as introducing the objective of the study. The chapter also includes a clarification of 
important concepts to be used in the thesis; a section on methodological considerations; and delimitations. 
      In chapter 2, I introduce the legal and theoretical basis of the study. Firstly, by studying international 
human rights law documents, I determine what international obligations states have with regards to 
protecting the human rights of its citizens, in particular with regards to past rights violations. Secondly, I 
determine the international standards and best practices for TCs, i.e. how TCs are expected to be set up and 
conduct their investigation, according to the international human rights community. Lastly, I introduce 
theoretical perspectives on TCs and their potential to improve human rights.  
      In chapter 3 I address the local context in post-coup Honduras: the human rights violations and the basics 
of the truth-seeking process. In order to make an informed analysis of the truth-seeking process, it is 
necessary to be familiar with the national context in which it was established and conducted its investigation. 
How severe was the human rights situation? Was the Honduran state involved in the violations? Has the 
situation improved or do the violations continue? This also provides the basis for determining whether the 
CVR has had an impact.  
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      The findings made in chapter 1-3 in this way provide the basis for conducting the analysis of the CVR 
and the truth-seeking process, which begins in chapter 4. The analysis is introduced by a short sum-up of the 
perspectives from the previous chapters, after which it is divided into three parts each addressing one of the 
study’s working questions. To make the analysis more dynamic I have chosen to incorporate my discussion 
throughout the analysis, instead of isolating the discussion in a separate chapter. 
      In the first part of the analysis, chapter 4.1, I address the question of whether the Honduran truth-seeking 
process was carried out in compliance with international standards and best practices for TCs. In order to 
answer this question I analyze the process from the establishment of the CVR, through the publication of the 
final report, to the ensuing follow-up phase. 
      Once I have determined whether the CVR complied with the internationally established standards and 
best practices for TCs, I use these findings in the second part of the analysis, chapter 4.2, where I seek to 
uncover how and to what extent the selected characteristics and methods of the CVR may affect its 
contribution to improving human rights in Honduras. Aiming towards this purpose I also make use of the 
context information that was found in chapter 3; the state obligations that were established in chapter 2.1; 
and the theoretical perspectives on TCs and human rights from chapter 2.3.  
      In the fourth and final part of the analysis, chapter 4.3, I address the role of the Honduran government in 
the process. Implicit in the question of how likely the CVR is to make a difference for human rights is the 
question of whether the Honduran government will allow it to make a difference. Has the government done 
any follow-up since the publication of the final report? Or has it sought to make people forget? What does 
this say about the truth-seeking process? Accordingly, as a final area of investigation, the thesis aims at 
finding out whether the CVR aimed at satisfying the rights of the Honduran people, or if it was in fact more a 
commission made to suit the needs of the elite and/or the government. To conduct this final part of the 
analysis I make use of the findings from throughout the study, and in particular Grodsky’s theory on TCs in 
repressive rule.  
      Hereafter, in chapter 5, follows the final conclusion of the study, providing a final answer to the research 
question.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
Based on the character of the research question, I have deemed qualitative methodology to be the most useful 
method. The field of TCs is filled with various negotiated arguments. It is my opinion that these arguments 
are best evaluated using qualitative content analysis because of its helpfulness when seeking to find themes 
and patterns of complex issues (Wildemuth & Zhang 2005: 1). By carefully scrutinizing the different 
arguments of the TC scholars, I will seek to identify and systematize the most prominent arguments, and 
clarify the causal relationship between TCs and human rights.      
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      With regards to the case of the CVR in Honduras, in order to properly examine how the truth-seeking 
process was conducted it has been necessary to inspect how it has been discussed on the ground in Honduras. 
This has, of course, depended on subjective interpretations. Moreover, for determining the extent and 
character of the human rights violations in Honduras, I depend on many diverse arguments coming from 
different actors, including interviews and qualitative fieldwork conducted by human rights organizations. 
Thus, in my view, the qualitative methodology is the most appropriate method for conducting this study.  
 
My research data has been collected from primary and secondary sources found primarily through the 
Internet, but also in the library, given that due to monetary constraints I was not able to conduct extensive 
fieldwork in Honduras. Two qualitative interviews with Honduran human rights defenders and one expert 
consultation were conducted to complement the primary sources found online. Other vital primary sources of 
the thesis are the CVR’s report, as well as newspaper articles and commentary on its investigation and the 
truth-seeking process. Another significant part of the primary literature is reports by various Honduran and 
international NGOs and institutions, e.g. international human rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), human rights bodies within the United Nations (UN) 
and the inter-American human rights system (IAHRS)3, and national human rights bodies such as the 
Committee of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared in Honduras (COFADEH) and the CdV, all 
reporting qualitatively on the human rights situation in Honduras. Additionally, written and spoken 
testimonies from Hondurans are included. My data includes both Spanish and English sources, given the 
valuable insight that local material can provide into the situation and processes in Honduras. Using 
Honduran newspaper and online articles as part of my empirical data has given me state-of-the-art 
knowledge on the contemporaneous situation in the country.  
      The secondary sources of the thesis consist of academic articles and books on TCs, all written by 
acknowledged experts within the field, among others political scientist Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, the author 
of “Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The Impact on Human Rights and Democracy” (2010), 
Priscilla Hayner, co-founder of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the author of 
“Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions” (2011), and political 
scientist Brian Grodsky, the author of “Justice Without Transition: Truth Commissions in Repressive Rule” 
(2007). Other secondary sources include international legal documents, treaties and agreements from the UN 
and the IAHRS, as well as reports and guidelines written by human rights organizations and institutions such 
as AI and the ICTJ, outlining their recommended best practices for TCs.  
                                                      
3 The Inter-American Human Rights System is comprised by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
(IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), both of which are organs of the Organization of 
American States. The IACHR and the IACtHR are responsible for overseeing compliance with the American 
Convention on Human Rights. 
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1.4.1 The Qualitative Interview  
The interviews included in this report are done with two Honduran human rights defenders who I have 
previously been introduced to via my engagement in Honduras. I have deemed them to be relevant sources 
for context dependent interpretation, and since it has been more than difficult to obtain information from the 
ordinary Honduran while being in Denmark, I have not interviewed more than these two women. It is my 
appraisal that even though my informants come from the same area of Honduras, i.e. the area around Puerto 
Cortés and San Pedro Sula, and are part of the same social segment (lower middle class, socially engaged 
women in their 50s), their opinions, impressions and experiences are valuable information for the purpose of 
this study. After all, they are Hondurans who have lived in Honduras their whole life; they have experienced 
the coup d’état and its aftermath; they are human rights activists who have insider knowledge of the situation 
of human rights defenders; and they are ordinary Hondurans, which means that they can give good insight 
into the amount of knowledge and the opinion that Hondurans have of the CVR. Based on this reasoning, it 
is my opinion that my informants’ points of view are significant and will thus be included in the analysis. 
Nevertheless, I am aware that the small sample as well as the homogeneity of my informants present a 
weakness of my method, and it is important to acknowledge the possible bias and the lack of 
representativeness arising from interviewing only two people from the same community and social segment. 
Ideally, fieldwork in Honduras and interviews with Hondurans from different parts of Honduras; the country 
and the city; of different social status; and representative of the entire political spectrum would have been 
preferable, as it would have produced a more valid knowledge base. While noting this methodological 
weakness, it is still my opinion that the views and observations of my informants is solid empirical evidence, 
which it would be a shame to omit. As mentioned, to supplement the interviews, I have made an effort to 
include information, quotes and commentary from a variety of different sources such as blogs, newspaper 
articles and press releases reflecting the different views and opinions of the Honduran public.  
 
The interviews were done to test my hypotheses. I considered interviews a good way of confirming/refuting 
that the human rights situation in Honduras is critical; that the Honduran state is repressive; and that the 
CVR did not sufficiently promote its work. As recommended by Kvale & Brinkmann (2008: 188), I prepared 
an interview guide containing short, clear, and simple questions. Since the interviews had to be done in 
Spanish, and since I was not in a position to execute the interviews personally face-to-face, I found it even 
more essential to make sure that the questions clear, so they were easily understood, and did not lead to 
misunderstandings. The way I conducted the interviews had advantages and some limitations. The interview 
with Zoila Lagos, who is the president of the Association of Mutual Support Between Women in Honduras 
(APOMUH)4, was done via email. This type of interview can be challenging, because it demands a certain 
skill level in written communication from both interviewer and interviewee; because it takes away the 
                                                      
4 For more information on APOMUH, see the following website: http://www.freewebs.com/apomuh/. 
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interviewer’s possibility of asking follow-up questions over the course of the interview; and because it 
removes the option of analyzing from body language (Kvale & Brinkmann 2008: 159). But Lagos gave 
articulated responses, making the interview quite useful. However, a misunderstanding did occur – she 
mixed up the CVR with the CdV – perhaps reflecting the language barrier. Luckily, the misunderstanding 
was obvious, so in my opinion it did not affect the quality of the interview. The interview with Fabia 
Gutierrez5, who is the president of the Collective of Working Women of Honduras (COMUTRAH)6, was 
carried out face-to-face by an assistant (a fellow volunteer from MAK), using the interview guide that I had 
prepared. The interview was recorded, and later transcribed. This form of interview had some of the same 
limitations as the email-interview, yet because the interview was done orally, Gutierrez was able to express 
herself more freely than if it had been done via email, which, according to Kvale and Brinkmann (2008: 189) 
is one of the success criteria for a good quality interview, and it did indeed produce good, in-depth 
responses. 
      My role in MAK, which puts me in a position of power to provide funds for the women’s organizations – 
funds of which they are in dire need – might have produced a bias in the respondents’ replies. They may 
have replied according to what they sensed that I wanted to hear to please me, or they may have exaggerated 
the gravity of their situation to lobby for funding from MAK. On the other hand, the fact that the respondents 
were aware of my role in MAK might have had some advantages, by reducing the limitations that might 
have been produced because of the fact that I am a young, white, European woman. By knowing of my 
engagement with human rights in Honduras, the women may have felt a closer connection to or trust in me, 
which might have led them to speak more freely about their views. All in all, I did not feel that my role in 
MAK compromised the interviews. It was my impression that the respondents replied honestly and without 
bias to my questions.  
 
Some argue that the knowledge produced through qualitative interviews is not valid knowledge, because it is 
based on subjective interpretations. However, as argued by Kvale & Brinkmann (2008: 194), qualitative 
interviews are a way of gaining privileged access to the daily world of the respondents, which, when used 
calculatedly without interpreting the individual perspectives as the undisputed truth, indeed qualifies as valid 
knowledge. Thus, in my analysis, I will be careful to use the knowledge I retrieved via my interviews 
skillfully, always making sure to back it up with further evidence. 
 
1.5 Delimitations 
I chose to limit my area of investigation to the CVR’s impact on human rights in Honduras. The 
circumstances surrounding the coup are complex, but in order to keep focus I will not go much into the 
                                                      
5 For information on Gutierrez’ background, see: 
http://www.lo.dk/Nyheder/Nyhedsarkiv/2007/10/20071030_solidaritetspris.aspx. 
6 For more information about COMUTRAH, see the following website: http://comutrah.wordpress.com/. 
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constitutional issues. Nor will I address the impact of the CVR on other important factors, such as e.g. 
democracy. 
      In the study the focus is on civil, political and collective rights, and not economic, social and cultural 
rights. This does not reflect any prejudice or preference on my part of civil and political rights, neither does 
it reflect a lesser responsibility on part of the Honduran state to respect and protect economic, social and 
cultural rights. Rather it reflects the fact that most TCs focus solely on civil and political rights, as has been 
pointed out by Hayner (2011: 77). 
      The scholarly debate on TCs and human rights is comprehensive. On the basis of my research question I 
have chosen to focus on the theory on how TCs can advance human rights, and not so much if they advance 
human rights.  
      It should be made utterly clear that my background is not in law, thus my focus in this study is more 
political, when referring to, and making use of, legal documents. I will rarely refer to the specific articles of 
the laws, declarations, covenants and conventions, but rather derive the broader meaning from them to 
support my arguments. 
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2 TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: OBLIGATIONS, 
STANDARDS AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
This chapter provides the legal and theoretical background needed to make a thorough analysis of the 
Honduran truth-seeking process and assess its potential to make a difference for human rights. The chapter 
has two interconnected purposes. Firstly, it determines what obligations states have according to 
international human rights law with regards to past human rights abuses. This, in cooperation with the 
findings that follow in chapter 3, provides the basis for analyzing the extent to which the Honduran state has 
fulfilled its international human rights obligations in the post-coup context. To be able to estimate the extent 
to which the CVR has contributed to improving human rights in Honduras, it is necessary to know what 
these rights entail: which rights do TCs have the specific purpose of addressing? Secondly, this chapter 
presents the theoretical perspectives upon which the analysis will be based. It begins by addressing the 
question of how a TC should be established and what should it be attentive to in its investigation, by 
outlining the internationally recommended best practices for TCs. Subsequently, the chapter moves on to 
addressing the theory on TCs’ contribution to human rights: what do TCs have the potential to do? In what 
way can they contribute to an improvement of human rights conditions? And what circumstances may 
compromise a TC’s impact? 
 
2.1 State Obligations Under International Human Rights Law  
 
“In all aspects of its work, a truth commission should reaffirm a state’s 
obligation under international law to combat impunity” 
(AI 2007: 20) 
 
International human rights law was born out of the atrocities of World War II. The world, astonished by the 
extent of the brutalities that had taken place, began developing international structures and standards for the 
protection and promotion of human rights to make sure that it could not happen again. The adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 led to an “internationalization” of human rights 
that had previously been subject to domestic jurisdiction, now making them an international concern. This 
notion of “global justice” – the application of international standards in national contexts (Shifter & Jawahar 
2004: 129) – continued to evolve with e.g. the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) in 1979, further outlining state obligations to protect and promote these rights (Friedman 
1993: 189). A regional dimension for states throughout the Americas was also added to the system with the 
IAHRS adopting the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) in 1969.  
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The UN “updated Set of Principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to 
combat impunity” (in the following: Set of Principles) (UNCHR 2005: 7) determine that, in order to 
effectively promote and protect human rights, states coming from a past of gross violations of human rights 
are obligated to 1) ensure that those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried, and duly 
punished; 2) provide victims with effective remedies and reparation; 3) ensure the right to know the truth 
about past human rights violations; and 4) take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations. 
The UN Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross 
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law (in the 
following: Basic principles and guidelines) further explains:   
 
Remedies for gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law include the victim’s right to the following as provided for under international law: (a) 
Equal and effective access to justice; (b) Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; 
and (c) Access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms (UN General 
Assembly 2006: 6). 
 
The following sections elaborate further on the rights of victims of past human rights violations to truth, 
justice, and reparation, which states are obliged to respect and promote; an obligation that is often dealt with 
via the establishment of a TC. This background will be utilized to appraise the extent to which the CVR had 
– or is likely to – have an effect on these rights in Honduras. 
2.1.1 The Right to the Truth 
 
“Full and effective exercise of the right to the truth provides 
a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations” 
(UNCHR 2005: 7) 
 
The right to the truth, both in its individual and collective dimension, has been explicitly referred to as a 
legal basis in the establishment of TCs (OHCHR 2006b: 6). It is linked with freedom of expression, which 
includes the right to seek and report information (ibid: 12), and is closely linked to many other rights, such as 
the right to legal protection, the right to an effective investigation, the right to be free from torture and ill-
treatment, the right to effective remedy, and the right to seek and report information. It is also closely linked 
to the obligation of the state to protect the human rights of its citizens and conduct effective investigations 
into gross human rights violations and to guarantee effective remedies and reparations (ibid: 14-15).  
The right to truth requires states to seek and obtain information on several factors: the causes, conditions and 
circumstances surrounding a person’s victimization and serious violations of international human rights and 
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humanitarian law7; the progress and results of the investigation; the fate and whereabouts of disappeared or 
murdered victims; and the identity of the perpetrators (OHCHR 2006b: 5, 11). It is widely recognized that in 
all cases of gross human rights violations, victims, their relatives, and society as a whole are entitled to know 
the truth, because truth, and the official acknowledgement thereof, is a fundamental human right for ensuring 
a person’s human dignity (ibid: 11, 14-15), and because “full and effective exercise of the right to the truth 
provides a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations” (UNCHR 2005: 7). International human 
rights actors such as the UN Human Rights Committee, the Commission on Human Rights, the IACHR, 
courts at international, regional and national levels, and international NGOs such as AI and the ICTJ, have 
all recognized the right to the truth as being inalienable in cases of gross violations of human rights, in 
particular cases of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and torture (OHCHR 2006b: 4, 10, 13; 
AI 2007; ICTJ 2013). International human rights law thus determines that truth should be treated as an 
inalienable and non-derogable right, and not be subjected to any form of limitation, such as amnesties or 
similar measures (OHCHR 2006b: 14-15). 
 
In my analysis I will use this information to assess the extent to which the CVR has fully satisfied the 
Honduran people’s right to know the truth.  
 
2.1.2 The Right to Justice 
Another right pertaining to victims of gross human rights violations is the right to justice. The Set of 
Principles outlines state obligations to secure this right: 
 
States shall undertake prompt, thorough, independent and impartial investigations of violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law and take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, 
particularly in the area of criminal justice, by ensuring that those responsible for serious crime under 
international law are prosecuted, tried, and duly punished (UNCHR 2005: 12). 
 
International human rights bodies have consistently stressed that the establishment of a TC is a 
complementary mechanism for ensuring accountability for gross human rights crimes, and that it cannot 
replace the courts. This is due to the fact that, as previously noted, TCs and courts are different in nature and 
should not be confused. The importance of bringing perpetrators to justice has been repeatedly emphasized 
by e.g. the IACHR maintaining that the establishment of TCs does not in any way absolve a state from its 
obligation to guarantee the victims’ right to a judicial investigation. To illustrate, here is what the IACHR 
concluded in the case of El Salvador (1999): 
 
                                                      
7 While humanitarian law applies in situations of armed conflict, human rights law applies at all times, both during war 
and peace (ICRC n.d.).   
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The value of truth commissions is that they are created, not with the presumption that there will be no 
trials, but to constitute a step towards knowing the truth and, ultimately, making justice prevail. Nor can 
the institution of a Truth Commission be accepted as a substitute for the State’s obligation, which cannot 
be delegated, to investigate violations committed within its jurisdiction, and to identify those responsible, 
punish them, and ensure adequate compensation for the victim (…) (IACHR 1999: para. 229-230). 
 
In continuation hereof, international human rights law stipulates that citizens have the right to a simple and 
prompt remedy for the protection of their rights, and thus states may not use amnesties or other immunities 
that leads to impunity and inflict with the victims’ right to justice (UNCHR 2005: 14; ACHR Article 25).  
The IACHR has underlined the contradiction between the application of amnesty laws and states’ obligations 
towards the ACHR: 
 
The Commission has stated repeatedly that the application of amnesty laws that hinder access to justice in 
cases involving serious human rights violations contravenes the obligation of the States parties to the 
American Convention to respect the rights and freedoms recognized therein and to guarantee the free and 
full exercise of those rights and freedoms by all persons subject to its jurisdiction, with no discrimination 
of any kind (IACHR 2010c). 
 
In the analysis I will assess the degree to which the Honduran state via the truth-seeking process has satisfied 
the Honduran people’s right to justice, taking into account the importance the international human rights 
actors places on trials and accountability of the perpetrators.  
 
2.1.3 The Right to Reparation  
Under international human rights law, victims of gross human rights violations have the right to be provided 
with full and effective reparation. According to the UN “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law”, “[s]tates 
should endeavor to establish national programmes for reparation and other assistance to victims in the event 
that the parties liable for the harm suffered are unable or unwilling to meet their obligations” (UN General 
Assembly 2006: 7). The reparation should be provided even if the perpetrator has not been identified, and 
should, as far as possible, be provided in the following five forms: 1) restitution, i.e. restoring the victim to 
the original situation before the violation occurred; 2) compensation for any economically assessable 
damage; 3) rehabilitation, i.e. medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services; 4) 
satisfaction, i.e. measures to ensure the victim’s right to truth and justice; and 5) guarantees of non-
repetition, i.e. ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces; ensuring that proceedings 
abide by international standards; strengthening the independence of the judiciary; protecting exposed groups; 
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educating society in international human rights law and training officials; and reforming laws that allow 
gross human rights violations to happen (UN General Assembly 2006: 7-9). 
      Has the truth-seeking process contributed to state compliance with the Honduran people’s right to 
reparation? This question will be addressed in the analysis.  
 
I will now move on to introduce the theoretical perspectives upon which the study will be based. In my 
analysis of the truth-seeking process in Honduras I will make use of the following theoretical perspectives 
that dominate the literature on TCs and human rights: 
a) International standards for TCs 
b) Theory on TCs’ impact on human rights  
 
2.2  Internationally Recommended Standards of Truth Commissions 
While the rights to truth, justice and reparation are clearly recognized by the human rights community; as 
pointed out by Priscilla Hayner (2011: 24) – co-founder of the ICTJ, an international organization with 
extensive experience working with TCs – stipulating how these rights should be implemented is more 
difficult. When setting up a TC, states confront a number of difficult choices, which can have serious 
consequences for the effects of the inquiry.  
      As mentioned in chapter 1, TCs come in many sizes and shapes, depending on the circumstances in the 
particular country of origin, and who has influence over their design and operation. And indeed, each 
country should shape their truth-seeking process based on its own historical, political, and cultural context 
(Hayner 1997: 175). However, “while there are good reasons for each to be shaped and empowered 
differently, there must be minimal standards” (Hayner 1997: 173).  
      Via their important role in assisting TCs in their establishment, functions and powers throughout the last 
two to three decades, international human rights actors have built valuable experience in the field. This has 
led to the establishment of basic principles and guidance notes to TCs based on previous experience and 
lessons learned in the implementation of these mechanisms. Yet, at the same time it is important that each 
TC experience is adapted to the specific context, and thus no one TC model should be imported uncritically 
elsewhere (UN 2006: 5).  
      In the following I will introduce the theoretical perspectives on how a TC process should be carried out 
to comply with the international human rights obligations outlined in section 2.1. These international 
standards will be addressed one by one relating to the Honduran case in the analysis in order to enable the 
assessment of the potential of the Honduran truth-seeking process to make a difference for human rights in 
Honduras.  
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2.2.1 The Establishment Phase 
 
2.2.1.1 Broad National Consultation 
According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the first question that states need to 
address when considering the establishment of a TC is whether the country is ready for it. The OHCHR 
instructs that the following elements should be present: a) there must be the political as well as the public 
will to begin a truth-seeking process, and b) the violent conflict or repressive practices must have come to an 
end (OHCHR 2006a: 2-3). Human rights organizations agree that when establishing a TC, states should 
involve all those concerned, including victims, human rights defenders and representatives of minorities and 
vulnerable groups. To contribute to building the legitimacy of the TC, in particular civil society 
organizations should be fully involved in all stages concerning the creation, mandate, powers and selection 
of commissioners via a comprehensive process of consultation and cooperation (AI 2007: 13-14; CEJIL 
2010c, 2010d: 12). The ICTJ has stated that it strongly discourages any closed-door decision making or 
establishing a TC through executive decree (CCR n.d.). The period of consultation should give all sectors of 
society a chance to make themselves heard, and should continue during the course of the investigation 
(OHCHR 2006a: 7).  
 
2.2.1.2 Mandate  
The proper formulation of a TC’s mandate is another area of importance. It is important due to the influence 
it has on the results of the investigation and on the recommendations, which the commission is required to 
present in its final report.  
      When formulating the TC’s mandate, states should make sure it is broad and flexible both with regard to 
the area of investigation and the period of time under investigation. The mandate should concern all cases of 
past human rights abuses, whether committed by state or non-state actors. A narrow mandate can impede the 
effectiveness of the commission, and thus it is recommended that the mandate does not list specific events to 
be investigated, but uses a more general language about the kinds of violations under investigation. To 
ensure that the TC does not appear politically biased, no key periods should be left out, however, violations 
that occur after the commission begins its work should not be part of the investigation (AI 2007: 14-16; 
OHCHR 2006a: 8-9; ICTJ 2008a: 2).  
      To make sure that the findings of the TC have consequences within the system, the mandate should state 
a specific commitment on part of the state to respond to the TC’s recommendations (OHCHR 2006a: 13). 
This may be through making reparations, structural reforms, or initiating investigations with the goal of 
punishing the perpetrators responsible for the human rights violations. To this end, it is recommended that a 
successor institution to monitor the implementation of the recommendations be created (AI 2007: 40; CEJIL 
2010c). With regards to the TC’s period of operation, it should be given sufficient time to properly fulfilling 
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its mandate. Experience has shown that TCs should preferably be granted a temporal mandate of about two 
years, with the possibility of extension if necessary (AI 2007: 14-16; OHCHR 2006a: 8).  
 
2.2.1.3 Selecting the Commissioners 
Carefully selecting the commissioners is crucial for the effective functioning of a TC. Members of the 
commission should be selected on the basis of their competence, i.e. their expertise in human rights; their 
proven independence, i.e. without political or other bias or motives; and their recognized impartiality. To 
encourage public and international trust in the TC, the commissioners should be selected though a 
transparent process with the full participation of civil society organizations. Adequate representation of 
commissioners that belong to groups that have been especially vulnerable to human rights violations should 
be ensured. Additionally, ideally, the commissioners should be widely respected individuals (OHCHR 
2006a: 13; AI 2007: 23-24).  
 
2.2.2 The Investigation Phase 
 
2.2.2.1 Public Outreach, Statement-taking and Public Hearings  
During the investigation period, it is crucial that TCs effectively publicize their work. All sectors of the 
population in all parts of the country should know of the work of the TC (AI 2007: 26; UN Secretary General 
2010: 19). The work carried out by the TC, including the hearings and the archives containing the evidence, 
should also be made accessible to the public. The public hearings are important because by giving victims a 
chance to tell their story before a public audience a commission can inspire a national discussion about the 
past, formally acknowledge past wrongs, make its work more transparent, reduce the prospect of denial of 
the truth and inspire reconciliation (UN Secretary General 2010: 18). Out of concern for the rights of the 
victims and the perpetrators, however, identities may be kept confidential from the public, but should still be 
handed over to the judicial authorities to secure that justice is made (AI 2007: 22, 35-36; OHCHR 2006a: 
11).  
      TCs should adopt a victim-centered approach, encouraging victims to participate in the process, and 
making sure they are properly treated, protected and supported (AI 2007: 27-28; ICTJ 2008b). The rights of 
everyone involved in the truth-seeking process, including the perpetrators, should be respected (AI 2007: 32-
33). TCs should seek all available sources of information from all sectors of society, including on-site 
investigations, visits, interviews and hearings. All cases of human rights violations should be investigated, 
while ensuring that evidence for future criminal proceedings is produced (AI 2007: 34-35).  
 
2.2.2.2 Final Report and Recommendations  
In its final report, the TC should make recommendations to the national government. The recommendations 
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may include legal, legislative or institutional reforms designed to prevent future violations or a reparations 
program for victims (UN Secretary General 2010: 20). The commission may also recommend the 
prosecution of named individuals or make a more general recommendation for further investigations to 
ensure criminal justice for the victims (OHCHR 2006a: 11). The recommendations and the results of the 
TC’s investigation should be “officially proclaimed, published and widely disseminated without undue 
delay” (AI 2007: 37). This should be done via several avenues, such as television or radio broadcast. It is 
important that the full report be dispersed as widely as possible, through the distribution of free copies and 
making it available online (AI 2007: 37), in order to help society understand and acknowledge its history, 
and to make the recommendations widely known and thus provide a pressure point for the government to 
follow up on them. 
 
2.2.3 The Follow-up Phase 
The state’s obligations do not end with the publication of the TC’s final report. The truth is not enough; the 
state must further ensure the right to justice and reparation of its citizens by implementing additional 
transitional justice initiatives. As TCs lack the power to enforce their recommendations, there is agreement 
within the international human rights community that to ensure that the truth is told, justice is done and 
reparation is provided, the establishment of a TC is not sufficient. A wider range of transitional justice 
measures should be implemented by the state in a holistic approach, including the prosecution of those 
alleged to be responsible for crimes under international law; the passing of legislative, institutional and other 
reforms to address the causes of the human rights violations; and the provision of full and effective 
reparation to the victims (AI 2007: 4; ICTJ 2008b). The ICTJ notes that, “[a]fter two decades of practice, 
experience suggests that to be effective, transitional justice should include several measures that complement 
each other. For no single measure is as effective on its own as when combined with the others” (ICTJ 2009).  
      Once the report is published, the TC’s job is finished, and the responsibility lies on the state to follow up 
on the recommendations made, and to some degree on civil society organizations to pressure the state to do 
so. Successfully implementing TC recommendations is generally a major challenge, either because the 
political will is not there or because of lack of institutional capacity or monetary limitations (UN Secretary 
General 2010: 31). Therefore it is recommended that a follow-up institution to monitor the implementation 
of the recommendations be created (CEJIL 2010c).  
In sum, for TCs to be effective, the government should consult with victims and civil society to formulate a 
broad and flexible mandate and select commissioners who are competent, impartial and independent. The TC 
should have broad powers, and should conduct public outreach and public hearings. It should make 
recommendations to the government to ensure that justice is done and reparations are given, and the 
government should implement these recommendations. 
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      Given that these standards are respected, international human rights actors are optimistic about TCs’ 
contribution to human rights improvements. This optimism also characterizes the scholarly debate, where 
studies generally agree that TCs have the potential of improving human rights. In the following section I will 
provide an overview of the different arguments on the causal relationship between TC activity and human 
rights improvements. The theoretical perspectives will be used in the analysis of the CVR in order to assess 
its potential to improve human rights in Honduras. 
 
2.3 Theory on Truth Commissions’ Impact on Human Rights 
 
“Widespread agreement exists that truth commissions can and should advance human rights” 
(Olsen et al. 2010: 459) 
 
Many existing studies agree that TCs have the potential of contributing to improved human rights (Olsen et 
al. 2010: 462). How do TCs accomplish this goal? Generally, in the academic debate, it is possible to 
identify the following arguments.  
 
One argument in favor of TCs is that the telling of the truth, along with the restorative justice approach 
applied by most TCs, contribute to societal reconciliation, which breaks the cycle of violence, and prevents 
further human rights abuses in the future (e.g. Reddy 2004: 21; Hayner 2011: 183). According to Rotberg 
and Thompson, “[t]here is a strong sense that societies can move forward only after it comes to terms with 
its collective angst (…) that a society emerging from an intrastate cataclysm of violence will remain stable 
and prosper, only if the facts are made plain” (eds. Rotberg & Thompson 2000: 6). Priscilla Hayner, expert 
on TCs, reached the same conclusion after her extensive fieldwork in post-apartheid South Africa:  
 
Only by remembering, telling their story, and learning every last detail about what happened and who was 
responsible were they able to begin to put the past behind them. In South Africa, time and time again, I 
heard survivors say they could forgive their perpetrators only if the perpetrators admitted the full truth 
(Hayner 2011: 2).  
 
The traditional way of understanding justice, i.e. criminal justice, aims at establishing accountability through 
trials and punishing the perpetrator for the crimes committed. Little or no attention is paid to recognizing the 
suffering of the victims, and the psychological and material needs of the victims are not considered a 
priority. Hence, many argue that justice is not achieved through criminal justice, because it deepens societal 
wounds and conflicts rather than contributing to reconciliation. As a means of addressing these limitations, 
restorative justice has emerged as a popular alternative to trials (Zehr 2003: 2). Restorative justice is an 
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alternative form of justice that focuses on healing relationships rather than on punishment. It is a victim-
centered approach that seeks to bring the marginalized – “those who are not able to participate with all their 
rights in the society” (Kerber 2003: 155), i.e. the victims – into the process of justice by recognizing their 
experiences. This principle of inclusion is, according to liberal ethicist John Rawls’ theory of justice, one of 
the principles necessary in order to assure an ethical, just society (Kerber 2003: 154-155). The assumption 
behind the restorative justice paradigm is that crime is a conflict among individuals, one that affects the 
victim, the perpetrator, the community, and society as a whole. The emphasis is therefore not simply on 
punishing the perpetrator, but on healing the victims and the relationships by applying a therapeutic 
discourse, and on reconciling the conflicting parties (Andrieu 2010: 13-14, 20). The central emphasis of 
restorative justice is on making right the wrongs and harms committed, by permitting the offender, e.g. the 
state, to acknowledge his wrongdoing and take active steps to repair the harm to the victim. In severe 
wrongs, like murder, repair can be impossible. But supporters of restorative justice hold that an effort to put 
things right can assist the victim in the process of healing (Zehr 2003: 27), and contribute to forgiveness and 
renewed relationships built on trust, which will eventually lead to reconciliation (Andrieu 2010: 21). The 
very process of telling their story is believed by some to have a healing effect on victims (Wiebelhaus-
Brahm 2010: 11).  
      According to political scientist Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm (Brahm n.d.), the restorative justice approach 
applied by most TCs is important in transitional societies because trials are not always feasible in such 
contexts. The judicial system may be flawed or insufficient, or may even have been complicit in the crimes 
committed in the past. Sometimes there are too many perpetrators, and the judicial system lacks the capacity 
to try them all. Sometimes perpetrators are too powerful. Through a restorative justice approach it becomes 
possible to address the victims’ right to justice in a non-judicial way.  
 
Another argument in favor of TCs is that they are more beneficial for human rights than trials, because trials 
tend to be backward-looking instead of forward-looking, which keeps them from promoting social renewal. 
Trials have little potential of restoring broken relationships, and they may even provoke further violence 
(Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010: 10, 14). TCs, on the contrary, promote forward-looking measures such as 
institutional reforms via their recommendations, while at the same time promoting backward-looking 
measures such as trials, memorials, reparations to victims, and replacement of corrupt judges and security 
officials. Hence, even though they do not have the power to prosecute and provide concrete punishment for 
past crimes, TCs may be more effective than trials, because they focus on institutions rather than individual 
perpetrators. Via their comprehensive investigations TCs not only uncover past human rights abuses, they 
also identify the institutional conditions that allowed the crimes to occur. By identifying the enabling 
conditions, TCs are thus able to make forward-looking recommendations designed to prevent the 
reoccurrence of human rights abuses (ibid: 10-11, 14). While they do not have the power to enforce their 
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recommendations, TCs, by providing a ”pressure point” to the government that can be very effective, can act 
as a starting point from which other measures for accountability, reparations and reforms are developed 
(Hayner 2011: 20; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010: 26).  
      Another aspect accentuated by scholars is that TCs have the potential to reach a broad group of 
perpetrators and victims. The broad investigation made by TCs differentiates them from trials, which 
generally focus on individual cases (Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010: 14). Also, TCs can promote accountability 
and combat impunity by naming the names of the perpetrators and thus damaging their image, which may 
have a deterrent effect (ibid: 25). Moreover, exposing the truth about past crimes aims at making such 
violations less acceptable in the future, i.e. TCs can contribute to educating society, leading to a change in 
society’s human rights norms (ibid: 10-11).  
 
Increasingly, there is a tendency for scholars to advocate the holistic approach to transitional justice (e.g. 
Hayner 2011; Andrieu 2010; Reddy 2004), which, as mentioned, is also advocated by the international 
human rights community. As noted in chapter 2.2, this approach is intended to overcome the weakness of 
single mechanisms such as TCs, trials or amnesties, by combining them to better address the many problems 
governments and societies face after periods of gross human rights violations (Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010: 
989-90). In a comprehensive study of TCs’ impact on human rights, political scientists Olsen et al. (2010) 
found that TCs, when used alone, tend to have a negative impact on human rights. When used in 
combination with trials and amnesties, on the other hand, they have a positive impact in human rights.  
 
Another theoretical perspective that I will make use of to assess the CVR’s potential to improve human 
rights in Honduras is Grodsky’s theory on TCs in the context of repressive rule. According to this theory, 
TCs are not always sincere efforts to reveal the truth; in fact, repressive leaders have in several cases, used 
TCs instrumentally (Grodsky 2007: 281). Grodsky argues that repressive elites launching truth-seeking 
processes choose to do so because they see it as beneficial for their own interests. This may be based on 
foreign relations-related motivations, such as foreign aid, loans or international legitimacy (ibid: 286). 
According to Grodsky, repressive leaders engaging in truth-seeking processes generally seek to ensure that 
the investigations they initiate will generate a degree of legitimacy without threatening their own power base. 
This, Grodsky argues, can be done by e.g. limiting the scope of the commission, controlling its activities, and 
manipulating its conclusions (ibid: 286-287). This problem has also been noted by e.g. Andrieu (2010: 17-
18), Reddy (2005: 1), and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010: 15-16). 
 
2.4 Conclusions  
Victims of gross human rights violations have the right to truth, justice and reparation. The right to truth also 
has a collective dimension, meaning that society is entitled to know the truth about what happened in their 
 25 
country’s past. It is the obligation of states to protect and promote these rights according to international 
human rights law.  
      Scholars who support TCs argue such commissions contribute to achieving restorative justice for the 
victims; promoting backward-looking measures such as trials and reparations; and preventing further human 
rights violations in the future by laying the foundation for reconciliation and prompting institutional reform. 
The results, however, may be compromised by the nature of the regime that enables the truth-seeking 
process. 
      The international human rights community, based on many years of experience, has outlined best 
practices for TCs to best address the rights of victims of past human rights violations, and impact positively 
on human rights. A holistic approach involving several transitional justice approaches is encouraged, so as to 
address the weaknesses of the TC method.  
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3 LOCAL CONTEXT: HONDURAS  
 
In order to fully understand the complexities of the truth-seeking process in Honduras, it is necessary to be 
familiar with the circumstances that led to its inception, as well as the setting in which the CVR operated. 
This chapter addresses the human rights situation in the post-coup context in order to determine the extent 
and character of the human rights violations that have taken place. Knowing the degree of severity of the 
situation provides a basis for making an informed analysis of a) the rights of the Honduran people, b) the 
obligations of the Honduran state, c) the way in which the truth-seeking process was carried out, and d) the 
reasons that the truth-seeking process played out the way it did. All these factors provide a basis for 
assessing the extent to which the CVR has – or is likely to – make a difference for human rights in Honduras. 
The chapter also briefly sums up the Honduran truth-seeking process as a prelude to the analysis.  
 
3.1 Extent and Character of the Human Rights Violations 
As its Central American neighbors, Honduras has long been a troubled country, and structural issues in the 
areas of security, justice, discrimination and marginalization have for decades affected the population of 
Honduras (IACHR 2009: 437). The military has long asserted influence over civilian governments, and 
Honduras has a history of several coups d’état and military governments. Even though a democratic 
government was first elected in the early 1980s, the human rights violations continued. The infamous 
military unit Battalion 3-16, which received support and training from the US, carried out political 
assassinations and torture of suspected opponents of the government (AI 1998; Cohn & Thompson 1995). In 
the beginning of the 1990s, Leo Valladares, the national commissioner for the protection of human rights in 
Honduras, carried out an independent investigation of the human rights violations and disappearances of the 
1980s8. The investigation documented the disappearance of at least 179 Hondurans between 1982 and 1992 
(Valladares Lanza 1994: 126), and since its publication in 1994, Valladares has repeatedly called for a full 
TC to further investigate Honduras’ past (Hayner 2011: 15). 
 
3.1.1 Coup d’État and De Facto Rule 
The CVR was established in the wake of the 2009 coup d’état, which was the first successful coup against a 
president in Central America since the end of the Cold War (Reuters 2009). The coup was the culmination of 
a months long institutional crisis between Honduran president José Manuel Zelaya Rosales and the 
leadership of his own Liberal Party, state institutions, fractions of the Honduran elite, and the military. It 
resulted in the military overthrow of the democratically elected president, and it had serious consequences 
for the already precarious human rights situation.  
                                                      
8 Hayner (2011: 15) refers to this investigation as a semi-official inquiry that served some truth-commission-like 
functions. 
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      The crisis was brought on by Zelaya calling for a non-binding referendum on whether Hondurans were in 
favor of including a proposal for a constituent assembly to reform the constitution, by adding a fourth voting 
urn to the scheduled elections on November 29, 2009. Zelaya’s opponents interpreted this proposal as a 
power grab, as it included the elimination of presidential term limits, even though the reform process would 
have begun after the end of Zelaya’s term. Zelaya took office in 2006 as part of the traditional, slightly left-
of-center Liberal Party, but during his term he became increasingly leftist, taking populist positions, such as 
reforms targeted for the poor, which gradually made the Honduran elite resent him. In 2008, Zelaya decided 
to make Honduras a member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), a move 
that some observers have emphasized as the main trigger for the coup, because many Hondurans, in 
particular the elite and the military, feared that Zelaya was trying to turn Honduras into a new Venezuela 
(Løvenbalk 2010; Pérez-Stable 2009).  
      In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the president of Congress, Roberto Micheletti Baín, was installed 
as president of a new de facto9 government. Then followed a period of seven months of de facto rule. The de 
facto government suspended key civil liberties, including freedom of expression and assembly. All of the 
cabinet members, who did not support the coup, were replaced, a curfew was imposed, and media outlets 
were closed. The coup provoked a strong condemnation from the international community, and a months 
long attempt by the inter-American democracy promotion regime to reverse the coup, an attempt that 
ultimately failed. Numerous statements and reports were issued documenting and condemning the human 
rights violations of the Micheletti regime. An AI report documented widespread use of unwarranted force 
and mass detentions of peaceful protesters on behalf of the security forces (AI 2009: 11), and the IACHR 
concluded the following:  
 
[D]uring its visit the Commission confirmed that serious human rights violations had been committed, 
including killings, an arbitrary declaration of a state of emergency, disproportionate use of force against 
public demonstrations, criminalization of public protest, arbitrary detention of thousands of persons, 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, poor detention conditions, militarization of Honduran territory, 
an increase in incidents of racial discrimination, violations of women’s rights, severe and arbitrary 
restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, and serious violations of political rights (IACHR 
2010b: 2). 
 
According to the Washington-based Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) (2009), over the 
course of the Micheletti rule, over 3.300 people were illegally detained and hundreds of these were tortured 
and suffered cruel and inhumane punishment. Since the behavior of the Honduran state represented a break 
with Honduras’ commitment to the ACHR, which it ratified in 1977 (IACHR 2010a: 441), in July 2009, 
                                                      
9 A de facto government refers to a government that comes into power by means not provided for in the country's 
constitution, exercising power as if legally constituted (World Bank 2013).  
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Honduras was suspended from the OAS, in particular based on the lack of respect for human rights in the 
country10 (IACHR 2010a: 471).  
      The coup aggravated institutional weaknesses, broke down the rule of law, and provoked a major 
polarization in society (OHCHR 2012). Some of the areas of controversy contributing to the polarization 
involved whether the events of June 2009 constituted a coup or presidential succession; the convening of a 
National Constituent Assembly and the issuance of a new Constitution; and the legitimacy of the presidential 
elections that led to Lobo becoming president (CVR 2011a: 57). According to Craig Scott, expert in 
international law and human rights, and commission member of the CdV, the polarization of Honduran 
society results from tensions between the social movements wishing for social justice and meaningful 
participation in government, and the two political parties, which are controlled by the powerful economic 
and military elites (Scott 2011: 12). It is important to add that the polarization and conflict that defines 
Honduras in the post-coup setting does not stem solely from the events of 2009, but from structural, social, 
economical and political factors that for many years have created polarization in certain sectors of Honduran 
society, albeit of lower intensity. It was a conflict that was already latent, but the coup aggravated the 
polarization (CVR 2011a: 57). Honduran human rights defender Fabia Gutierrez has experienced the 
aggravation: “It is true that there have always been violations but they completely deteriorated after the 
coup. It is really a state of polarization” (interview Jan 2013). 
 
3.1.2 The Lobo Government 
In highly controversial elections in November 2009, Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo Sosa of the conservative National 
Party was elected president, and his inauguration in January 2010 marked the end of the de facto rule, 
although many argue that his presidency is a continuation of the de facto rule. I will return to this argument 
later, in the analysis.  
      Within the international community there was disagreement on whether or not to recognize the 
presidential elections. While e.g. the U.S. and the OAS chose to recognize the elections, arguing that it was 
the best way for Honduras to move forward, several Latin American organizations, and most of the Latin 
American governments, refused to acknowledge the elections, because they took place under a repressive 
regime and represented a consolidation of the coup (MercoPress 2009a, 2009b). A broad segment of the 
Honduran population also opposed the elections and thus chose to boycott them (Carlsen 2012; Joya 2010: 
20). Latin American governments and the resistance movement National Front for Popular Resistance 
(FNRP)11 consistently demanded the return of Zelaya to his post. The fact that the elections were carried out 
                                                      
10 Another factor contributing to Honduras’ suspension from the OAS was that the coup represented a break against 
Honduras’ commitment to the Inter-American Democratic Charter.  
11 The FNRP is an independent social mobilization front made up of popular movements, social organizations, student 
movements, the national teachers federation, human rights groups, women, intellectuals, indigenous and black 
communities, the LGTB community etc., which holds considerable power in Honduras today (Joya 2010: 21). 
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despite the fact that so many thought them illegitimate, may have contributed further to the polarization of 
Honduran society. Another question of legitimacy regarding the Lobo administration concerns the fact that 
many of the official and military figures that took part in, or legitimized, the coup, have kept their powerful 
positions, and many of them have been selected directly by Lobo (Joya 2010: 20).  
 
Surely, nobody had expected the country to quickly recover, however, as The Economist (2013) puts it in a 
recent article: ”even pessimists must be disappointed by what has happened”. After the insertion of the new 
government, human rights violations have persisted to be a serious problem in Honduras, and the Lobo 
government has been criticized for failing to provide accountability for the human rights violations 
committed during the de facto government, and for failing to adequately address the spiraling violence and 
lack of rule of law, which is seriously affecting human rights in Honduras (AI 2011; IACHR 2012). Since 
Lobo came to power, Honduras has become the country with the highest murder rate in the world. A murder 
rate that is more than four times higher than Mexico; that has more than doubled in the past five years; and 
continues to increase (UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2012: 15; The Economist 2012). There is a violent 
death every 74 minutes, and in 2012, 86 out of 100.000 people were murdered, and for young men in their 
twenties, 1 of 300 faced a chance of being murdered, or 1 of 150 in the most dangerous towns (Carlsen 2012; 
The Economist 2013; Pressly 2012).  
 
In 2012, the IACHR reported: 
 
[D]isturbing information on the situation of journalists, human rights defenders, the peasants in Bajo 
Aguán, indigenous peoples and LGTBI persons, all against the backdrop of high rates of murder and 
impunity that strike particularly hard at women, children and adolescents, amid a serious citizen security 
problem which has left Honduras with the highest murder rate in the world (IACHR 2012: 349).  
 
According to the IACHR, the continuing human rights violations relate to citizen security, weaknesses in the 
judicial system, lack of independence of the judiciary, and discrimination and marginalization of certain 
sectors of society. Moreover, some of the violations are directly related to the coup d’état, particularly the 
right to freedom of expression and the situation of human rights defenders, the role of the military in 
domestic security12, and issues related to the separation of powers (IACHR 2012: 344). The IACHR 
underlines that the situation in Honduras has “a serious and grave effect on the enjoyment and exercise of the 
fundamental human rights enshrined in the American Convention on Human Rights” (IACHR 2012: 344), and 
thus is disturbing with regards to the Honduran state’s respect for and guarantee of its citizens’ rights to life 
and humane treatment (IACHR 2010: 349). 
                                                      
12 Since November 2011 the government has made use of military troops for patrolling in the streets (Economist 2012). 
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The lack of citizen security is one of the most serious problems with regards to the protection of human 
rights. Citizen security refers to a citizenry that is able to live free from violence and crime practices by state 
and non-state actors, and the state is obliged to guarantee and protect the security of its citizens13 (IACHR 
2012: 349). The Honduran state has repeatedly maintained that organized crime bears a great deal of the 
responsibility for the worrying increase in violence. In recent years, due to its strategic geographic position, 
Honduras has become an important drug route, and the increased conflicts related to drug trafficking, in 
combination with the presence of maras14 and other gangs, has contributed to a violent climate and to 
increased corruption, as it has made its way into the police, politics and the judicial branch (IACHR 2012: 
350-351). The Honduran state also maintains that the killings are not related to the coup, i.e. not politically 
motivated crimes (IACHR 2010a: 486, 498; HRW 2012: 2).  
 
Some particular circumstances seem to refute this argument though. The freedom of expression is still under 
pressure in Honduras. Human rights defenders seeking justice for human rights violations during and after 
the coup are a very exposed group in the post-coup context. Since the coup human rights defenders have 
been suffering from intimidation, harassment and attacks. The human rights defenders most at risk are, inter 
alia, lawyers, judges, defenders working for the rights on the most marginalized sectors of society, and 
journalists (OHCHR 2012). The CdV has suffered several attacks on its offices (La Tribuna 2011), and 
according to COFADEH, daily disappearances, murders and violence against resistance movement members 
are commonplace (Ashby 2010). In 2011, CEJIL reported that at least 50 human rights defenders had been 
murdered since the coup, while COFADEH reported over 120 murders of members of the Honduran 
resistance and that at least 157 resistance members had gone into exile due to political repression (CCR 
2011). Throughout 2011 and 2012, human rights organs received various reports concerning attacks on and 
threats against journalists and media outlets in Honduras (AI 2012: 51; IACHR 2012: 369-377) and since 
Lobo took office in January 2010, 23 journalists have been murdered, out of the 29 journalist killings in 
Honduras in the past decade (Reporters Without Borders 2012). A report from one of the largest 
international human rights groups, HRW, as well as the report of the CdV, highlight that the attacks on 
journalists are part of a broader pattern of violation against exposed minority groups or people who threaten 
the power structure in some way (HRW 2012; CdV 2012) thus accusing the government of leading low 
intensity warfare against these groups. For all these reasons, many, e.g. COFADEH (2010a: 6) and the New 
York-based Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR n.d.), consider the Lobo government to be a repressive 
regime. This seems to be an across-the-board consideration among human rights defenders in Honduras. 
                                                      
13 Citizen security involves multiple actors and factors, including the history and structure of the state and society; the 
government’s policies; the observance and enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights; and the regional and 
international scenario (IACHR 2012: 349). 
14 Criminal gangs originating from Central American countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. 
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When asked about the government, the president the Association of Mutual Support Between Women in 
Honduras (APOMUH), Zoila Lagos, replied:  
 
Yes [we are living under a repressive regime]. Every day there are assassinations and violations of human 
rights, which are being executed by the police and the army. There is no popular mobilization that is not 
threatened (…) And it is the de facto government against the people; it is the power of arms and money 
against the poor (…) they are in reality sad those who govern us (…) they are corrupt (…) they do not 
give a fig about human rights (…) in order to stay in power they are capable of whatever, they are brazen 
(…) (Interview Feb 2013). 
 
In its 2012 report, “La voz más autorizada es la de las victimas” (The most authorized voice is that of the 
victims), the civil-society truth commission, the CdV, made the following disturbing conclusions:  
 
The commission has determined that the irregular acts attributed to the police and military personnel not 
only during the de facto regime of Roberto Micheletti Baín, but also in Porfirio Lobo’s current 
administration, were and continue to be part of a state policy (…) Both governments used and uses terror 
as a means of social control (…) [S]ince the coup, with the consent of the government, operations of 
groups have developed, which operate at the margin of the law with death squad procedures and 
methodologies. These organizations appear to be currently linked to organized crime and drug activity 
and to actions that usually diffuse as “cleansing or social cleansing”. The Commission has been able to 
ascertain that they are responsible for the various assassinations of key actors of the resistance to the coup 
d’état, and popular human rights organizations. The work developed by the Commission permits us to 
conclude that the existence and actualization of this type of illegal structures is an indivisible part of the 
applied state policies (CdV 2012: 298).  
 
The human rights violations have taken an especially heavy toll on those sectors of Honduran society that 
have historically been marginalized, i.e. women, indigenous and Garífuna (afro-Honduran) peoples, and the 
LGBT community. Since the coup, the crimes committed against these groups have increased, including 
hundreds of murders (Freedom House 2013), and it seems that in many cases the perpetrators are the security 
forces, which leads to even fewer investigations (IACHR 2010a: 492-498; AI 2012: 43). These 
circumstances has led to a complete lack of trust in authorities among Hondurans, and even the spokesman 
of the Honduran police force, Héctor Mejía, admits that the police has “fallen into total discredit” (The 
Economist 2013). As observed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR 2011: 295), there 
is considerable evidence of police officers’ involvement in summary and extrajudicial executions, and 
former Police Commissioner Maria Luisa Borjas has stated – quite famously – that “it’s scarier to meet up 
with five police officers in the streets than five gang members” (Main 2012: 4). 
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      Excessive use of force against demonstrators has continued under Lobo. In March 2012, members of the 
national police attacked teacher union demonstrators protesting the proposed privatization of the education 
system using tear gas and beating people with batons, killing one woman (HRW 2012: 2).   
      Moreover, impunity persists to be a problem, especially concerning murders of journalists, women, 
youth, street children and members of the LGBT community. Nine out of ten of the murders go unpunished, 
and often they are not even investigated (IACHR 2012: 351; The Economist 2012). The lack of protection 
has led many Hondurans to block themselves off in “barrios seguros” (safe neighborhoods), hiring security 
guards and installing metal doors and barbed wire fences. Needless to say, the poor do not have this 
possibility (The Economist 2013), further contributing to polarization of society. 
 
In the Bajo Aguán region15, human rights violations continue to intensify in a longstanding land conflict 
between campesinos (peasant farmers) on the one side, and business interests and private landowners on the 
other. Since the coup, the number of murders and threats against campesinos in the region has increased, in 
spite of a 2010 agreement between the government and the peasant organizations in the area (IACHR 2012: 
354; AI 2013: 32). The situation in the Bajo Aguán has received attention among national and international 
groups that are concerned about the role of state-sponsored security forces in the human rights violations. 
According to 14 international organizations protesting the violence in the Bajo Aguán, between 2009 and 
2012, no less that 53 persons that either supported or were members of the campesino organizations were 
killed in the conflict. The international organizations consider the agrarian conflict to be “the most severe in 
terms of the degree of violence committed against peasants in Central America over the past 15 years” 
(FIAN International et al. 2012). In March 2012, 94 representatives of the U.S. Congress and seven senators 
wrote to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, expressing their concern about the situation and urging 
the U.S. government to take action to protect human rights in the Bajo Aguán and the rest of the country, and 
to suspend all police and military aid to Honduras (U.S. Congress 2012; U.S. Senate 2012). In April 2012, 
another letter was sent, this time to president Lobo from the Honduras Solidarity Network (HSN), which 
consists of more than 20 U.S. organizations. It was an appeal to the government of Honduras to take action 
to prevent the ongoing violations of human rights and violence, e.g. via an integral land reform rather than 
the use of security forces (HSN 2012). Yet, to this day, the situation continues to be critical.  
 
Another area of concern relates to the judicial branch, and the guarantees of due process of law and effective 
access to justice. In the years since the coup, the process of rebuilding the democratic order in Honduras has 
presented great challenges. The independence of the judicial branch seems to be threatened by interference 
from members of other branches of government and even organized crime. This, combined with harassment 
such as death threats and even assassinations of judges who have expressed opposition to the coup, can affect 
                                                      
15 Bajo Aguán refers to the lower part of the Aguán River Valley, near Honduras’ northeastern coast. 
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the access to justice for victims of human rights violations (IACHR 2012: 356). In August 2011 the Supreme 
Court fired four judges who had publicly opposed the coup (HRW 2012: 3), and in December 2012, 
Congress illegally dismissed three Supreme Court judges for repeatedly ruling against new laws (Freedom 
House 2013), creating new constitutional tensions just as the country prepares for the coming presidential 
election in November 2013. The judges who replaced those who were discharged have since approved 
several controversial laws, including one that gives Congress the power to fire senior public officials (The 
Economist 2013; LatinNews 2013). It seems, as The Economist (2013) puts it, that “Honduras’s politics has 
become as dysfunctional as its government and security forces”, and the rule of law seems to be breaking 
down (IACHR 2010a: 480; IACHR 2012: 356).  
 
In 2012, Honduras was ranked 133 out of 176 countries in Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption 
Perceptions Index (Freedom House 2013). There is talk about the risk of Honduras becoming a failed state 
(e.g. The Economist 2013), and the Fund for Peace (2013), in its Failed States Index, warns that this may be 
the case, labeling Honduras as “in danger”. This situation does not inspire optimism. In the words of human 
rights defender Fabia Gutierrez: 
 
The truth is that the systematic human rights violations deteriorated after the coup. Every day it gets 
worse. We are not looking at a horizon where there may be a proposal from the rulers saying that they 
will respect human rights. On the contrary. Now there is more repression, more violations, and more 
assassinations (interview Jan 2013). 
 
 
3.2 The Honduran Truth-seeking Process 
The CVR, which as mentioned in chapter 1 derived from the OAS-mediated Tegucigalpa/San José Accord, 
was established by executive decree, unilaterally by president Lobo, in April 2010 (Executive Decree 2010), 
without consulting with the Honduran public. 
      Fabia Gutierrez, member of Honduras’ civil society, when asked about the CVR, replied: “(…) we don’t 
know it. We have only heard about it in the medias. We don’t know who its members are. We don’t know how 
they were selected. Nor do we know for what they were elected” (interview 31 Jan 2013), reflecting the lack 
of consultation. 
      This initial step was widely criticized, and several human rights groups stated their concern for the 
hurried steps to establish the CVR. In a 2010 interview made by the Cambridge-based NGO May I Speak 
Freely Media, the coordinator of the Tegucigalpa-based Center for the Investigation and Promotion of 
Human Rights (CIPRODEH), José Javier Acavedo, expressed concern about the lack of consultation with 
the victims of the human rights violations and the political resistance: “How can you have a [truth 
commission] without consulting the victims? There hasn’t been a clarification of who the actors or victims 
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are, nor has the resistance been brought into the conversation” (May I Speak Freely Media 2010a). 
      Another point of critique in this initial phase was the fact that the CVR was installed in a context of 
ongoing human rights abuses and under a president of questionable legitimacy. The human rights group 
CEJIL, represented by its attorney Marcia Aguiluz, expressed the following concern about the ongoing 
abuses at the time of the establishment of the CVR:  
 
[W]e are very concerned how these things are happening and that there is no real response from the 
official government institutions. Their message is that things are getting better, but on the contrary things 
are not changing, they are getting worse (…) There can’t be a Truth Commission if the government 
doesn’t have a real commitment to investigate (May I Speak Freely Media 2010a). 
 
On the day of the installation of the CVR, the Honduran newspaper El Tiempo published a letter written on 
behalf of 55 U.S.-based rights groups. The letter stated the following:  
[T]he installation (…) of the so-called Truth Commission, organized by the criminals themselves, is a 
travesty of justice. There can be no “truth” and no “reconciliation” without the end of impunity and the 
restoration of the Honduran people’s democratic sovereignty (NewsNotes 2010).  
 
Both CEJIL and the Honduran Human Rights Platform sent letters to the OAS expressing their concern. The 
Human Rights Platform stated its position that the CVR was illegal and illegitimate because constitutional 
order had not been reestablished, and requested that the OAS withdraw its support and funding for the 
commission (May I Speak Freely Media 2010b). 
 
The mandate of the CVR, which was determined unilaterally by president Lobo, directed the CVR to a) 
clarify the events that occurred before and after June 28, 2009; b) identify the acts that led to the crisis 
situation; and c) make proposals to the Honduran people in order to avoid the repetition of such acts in the 
future (CVR 2011b: 21). When the CVR’s mandate first became known, it was widely criticized, because it 
made no mention of the human rights situation, leading several human rights groups to express concern that 
these abuses would be ignored and remain in impunity. The concern was cemented by president Lobo 
publicly stating that the CVR was “not for judging anybody, but rather for finding reconciliation for the 
Honduran people” (CEJIL 2010d: 5).  
      At a May 2010 meeting at the Washington-based NGO, the Inter-American Dialogue, the CVR’s 
coordinating commissioner Eduardo Stein explicitly stated that the goal of the CVR should not be compared 
to the goals of previous Latin American TCs. The CVR’s primary objective was not to investigate human 
rights violations; instead the main objective was political, namely to “clarify how the institutional 
scaffolding of Honduras was dismantled and a crisis ensued”, said Stein (May I Speak Freely Media 2010b).  
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Yet, on several occasions during the investigation, Stein made public statements emphasizing that human 
rights violations would also be part of the inquiry (Scott 2011; Mejia 2010). These assurances were 
confirmed in the final report, where human rights violations were in fact included. In the section “Objectives 
of the Report and Objects of Investigation”, the CVR states that one of its objects of investigation is “human 
rights violations produced between June 28, 2009 and January 2010” (CVR 2011a: 52).  
       
On May 4, 2010, the CVR was formally installed and president Lobo selected its five commissioners, 
whereof two were Hondurans and three were foreigners (CCR n.d.). The international commissioners were 
coordinating commissioner Eduardo Stein, former vice president of Guatemala; Michael F. Kergin, former 
Canadian diplomat, and lawyer at Bennett Jones; and María Amabilia Zavala Valladares, former justice 
minister of Peru. The national commissioners were the current and former rectors of the National 
Autonomous University of Honduras, Julieta Castellanos Ruiz and Jorge Omar Casco Zelaya, respectively 
(CVR 2011a: 46; Latin America Press 2010; CCR n.d.).  
      Lobo was widely criticized for his choice of commissioners. Shortly after the installment of the CVR, 
Marcia Aguiluz, attorney at CEJIL, expressed concern about the limited human rights background of the 
commissioners, stating that CEJIL’s “main concern on those commissioners is that there are no profiles on 
them being involved with human rights concerns; we do not have any record of their human rights 
knowledge or any related field (May I Speak Freely Media 2010a). In a 2010 press release, the Honduran 
human rights group COFADEH argued that the national commissioners were supporters of the coup, saying 
that Honduran commissioner Castellanos is herself a violator of human rights who has led a “ferocious 
campaign of political persecution, to the extreme of calling the repressive forces in to quash the actions of 
the union members and students” (COFADEH 2010), referring to the many strikes and demonstrations that 
have taken place at the National Autonomous University of Honduras since the coup. COFADEH noted that 
reportedly Castellanos and commission member Casco are both known for their affiliation with Lobo’s 
National Party, making them key players among the groups of power in Honduras (COFADEH 2010).  
 
While the CVR was widely disputed by human rights defenders, it also received criticism from the Honduran 
political right wing. What is odd is that conservatives of the Civic Democratic Union (Unión Cívica 
Democrática), a coalition of right-wing groups that actively supported the coup, called for the removal of 
Honduran commissioner Castellanos from the Commission, on the basis of her alleged affiliation with the 
left wing (Mejia 2010), while human rights group COFADEH accused her of being an ally of the National 
Party. The president of the National Association of Industrialists, Adolfo Facussé, an outspoken supporter of 
the coup, stated: 
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[T]his Truth Commission is a demand of the international community and we already know what its 
findings will be. They will be geared to what the world wants to hear, and not to what really happened in 
Honduras. I don’t have very high expectations regarding this question. It won’t contribute to 
reconciliation; on the contrary, it will create greater division (Mejia 2010). 
 
Thus, the CVR was under fire from all sides.  
 
The result of the CVR’s work, an 800-page report entitled “Para que los hechos no se repitan” (So that the 
events are not repeated), was released on July 7, 2011, approx. 14 months after it began its investigation. It 
contains three parts: the main report, which includes the analysis; a detailed chronology of the events; and a 
part containing testimonies.  
      The report’s main conclusion, perhaps, was that the events of June 28, 2009, constituted an illegal coup 
d’état, and not constitutional succession as had been argued by the instigators of the coup (CVR 2011a: 394; 
Freedom House 2013). With regards to the rights of the Hondurans, the report concluded that during the 
coup and the Micheletti rule, multiple human rights violations had occurred in the form of deprivation of 
liberty, torture, rape, political persecution and at least 20 violent deaths at the hands of the police and the 
military (Rasmussen 2011).  
      In the report, the CVR informed that it held at least 30 informational meetings between May and 
September 2010, informing the public of its work, as well as 60 meetings with regional and local leaders in 
26 Honduran cities (CVR 2011a: 53). Furthermore, the CVR stated that it had a team of human rights experts 
gather approx. 280 testimonies from more than 230 witnesses and victims of human rights abuses. 
Furthermore it conducted 37 interviews with principal protagonists; 180 interviews with key actors; and 125 
collective reunions (CVR 2011a: 35, 54).  
      The CVR set forward 88 recommendations to make sure that the events that took place between June 
2009 and January 2010 would not be repeated. 24 of the recommendations aimed at satisfying human rights, 
inter alia though institutional reforms (USCVR 2012: 9).  
 
3.3 Conclusions  
In the almost four years since the coup d’état, the rights of the Honduran people have been grossly violated. 
The Honduran government has failed to uphold its commitment to the UDHR and the ACHR to respect, 
protect and fulfill the human rights of its citizens. The situation has not improved since the takeover of 
President Lobo – on the contrary. Threats and attacks on particular groups are ongoing, and according to 
some, escalating (Scott 2011: 7-8). There is considerable evidence that state security forces are 
systematically violating the rights of Hondurans, including the right to life, the right to freedom and security, 
minority rights, the right to justice, and freedom of expression. Some observers regard the situation in 
Honduras as being at the point of social and state collapse. And the fact that the state of Honduras has failed 
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to hold accountable those responsible for human rights violations, neither those committed under the de facto 
government nor those committed during the course of Lobo’s presidency, adds to the gravity of the situation 
(HRW 2012: 1). The creation of the CVR was met with widespread criticism from the Honduras public, in 
particular by civil society, and the choice of commissioners was met with skepticism from across the 
political spectrum.  
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4 ANALYSIS OF THE CVR AND THE TRUTH-SEEKING PROCESS 
 
In the previous chapters, in short, I have found that a) states coming from a past with gross human rights 
violations are obliged to secure the right to truth, justice and reparation of their citizens, b) the international 
human rights community has established certain standards for TCs, which states are expected to follow in 
order to properly address these obligations, c) TCs can advance human rights in a backward-looking and a 
forward-looking way, and function best when a holistic approach is applied, d) gross human rights violations 
have taken place in Honduras since the coup, and many consider the Lobo government to be repressive, and 
e) the CVR was not received well among the Honduran people.    
      On the basis of these findings I will now move on to analyzing the truth-seeking process in post-coup 
Honduras, addressing the following questions:  
• To what extent did the Honduran truth-seeking process comply with international human rights law 
and standards?  
• How likely is the CVR to make a difference for human rights, and which obstacles can be identified 
for this to happen?  
• How did the Honduran government influence the CVR’s contribution to human rights?  
 
As revealed in chapter 1.3.4, the analysis will also include elements of discussion. By addressing the 
mentioned questions, I will move towards answering the research question: To what extent is the Honduran 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission likely to contribute to an improvement of human rights in post-coup 
Honduras? 
 
As noted by the UN Secretary General (2010: 31), many different factors may shape a country’s post-
transition reality. The impact of a TC’s report may depend less on its content than on the surrounding factors, 
including when and in what circumstances the report is released and publicized, how widely it is distributed, 
how much coverage it receives in the media, and, perhaps most importantly, how the political authorities 
treat the report and whether they have any interest in publicizing and implementing its conclusions and 
recommendations. The national context is significant for a TC’s success, as the commission’s work and the 
follow-up of its recommendations may be affected by factors such as the strength of the groups who were 
responsible for the violations; how vocal and organized civil society is; and the interest and involvement of 
the international community (Hayner 2011: 17). How did the national context shape the Honduran TC 
experience? This question will be addressed in the following.  
 
 
 
 39 
4.1 The Establishment, Process and Report of the CVR 
In this section I will assess the degree to which international human rights law and standards for TCs, which 
were scrutinized in chapter 2, entered into the establishment, process and report of the CVR. In this way it 
becomes possible to assess the legitimacy of the CVR. Also, this provides a basis for determining its 
potential to make a difference for human rights. The section is divided into five subsections each addressing 
an important aspect of the Honduran truth-seeking process.  
 
4.1.1 Based on Broad Consultation? 
As mentioned in chapter 3.2, the CVR was established by executive decree, unilaterally by president Lobo, 
without consulting with the Honduran public. International standards for TCs (chapter 2.2) prescribe that in 
order to gain the trust and support of the public, and contribute to the legitimacy of the commission, TCs 
should engage in broad national consultation with especially the victims and civil society to decide upon the 
mandate and composition of the commission. By establishing the CVR unilaterally, the Honduran 
government failed to comply with this standard, thus from the start compromising public trust in the 
commission and its legitimacy.  
 
As concluded at the end of chapter 3, the situation in Honduras at the time of the creation of the CVR was 
characterized by ongoing repressive practices grossly violating rights protected in both the ACHR and the 
UDHR, and many considered the government to be a continuation of the de facto regime. This represented 
another breach with the international standards (chapter 2.2), which prescribe that a state should only 
establish a TC if the country is ready for it – which presupposes that there is the political and public will to 
begin a truth-seeking process, and that the violent conflict or repression has come to an end. First of all, 
clearly, the violence and repression had not come to an end in Honduras. Second of all, the widespread 
critique from Honduran human rights defenders at the point of the CVR’s establishment (cf. chapter 3.2) 
show that had civil society been consulted, they would probably not have supported the idea of a TC at that 
particular time. Finally, as mentioned, the CVR did not arise from Honduran aspirations. Its establishment 
derived from the Tegucigalpa/San José Accord and was a prerequisite for Honduras to be readmitted to the 
OAS, and regain international recognition. Hence, the Honduran government’s decision to engage in truth-
seeking was probably more based on political need and international pressure than political will. In sum, it 
appears that Honduras was not ready for a TC at the time of its establishment, and consequently Lobo failed 
to comply with the international standards to only initiate a truth-seeking process if the country is ready for 
such a process.  
 
4.1.2 A Broad and Flexible Mandate?  
As was established in chapter 2.2, when formulating a TC’s mandate, states should make sure it is broad and 
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flexible both with regards to the area of investigation and the period of time under investigation, and that it 
concerns all cases of past human rights abuses. Can this be said of the CVR’s mandate? 
      As mentioned, the mandate determined by president Lobo directed the CVR to a) clarify the events that 
occurred before and after June 28, 2009; b) identify the acts that led to the crisis situation; and c) make 
proposals to the Honduran people in order to avoid the repeat of such acts in the future (CVR 2011b: 21). 
The mandate thus aimed at establishing the truth, placing blame, and making recommendations. But to what 
degree and with what focuses? 
      In chapter 3.2 we saw that the mandate suffered fierce critique from human rights actors, because it made 
no mention of human rights, reflecting a focus that was not centered on investigating into the human rights 
abuses. CEJIL argued that the mandate made the victims of human rights violations invisible and denied 
them the right to the truth (CEJIL 2010d: 6). The New-York based ICTJ issued a statement expressing a 
similar concern about the CVR’s mandate:  
 
The [CVR’s] mandate is a cause for concern. It does not cover assassinations and attacks perpetrated 
against journalists and social activists since June 2009 (…) There cannot be reconciliation without full 
truth and justice for victims. The lack of direct consultation with victims and a broad range of political 
and civil society actors raises questions about the integrity of this effort. The international community 
should carefully judge the legitimacy of this initiative (Latin America Press 2010). 
 
Indeed, the fact that the CVR’s mandate was limited to clarifying “the events before and after June 28, 2009 
in order to identify the acts that led to the crisis and provide the Honduran people with the elements 
necessary to avoid the repetition of these actions in the future” (CVR 2011b: 21) represented a failure to 
clearly include the state’s obligation to investigate human rights violations in the mandate. This obligation, 
which is specified in Principle 1 of the UN Secretary General’s Guide on Transitional Justice, states that all 
transitional justice measures should guarantee that states comply with their international obligation to 
investigate serious human rights violations and guarantee the right to truth, reparation and justice (UN 
Secretary General 2010: 3-4). 
      As noted earlier, despite not being mentioned in the mandate, in the end, human rights violations were 
included in the investigation; yet, in the final report it is clear that the violations presented only one point of 
investigation out of 14 (CVR 2011a: 52) leaving the commission with little time to investigate the rights 
abuses. After all, it was expected to finish its work in approx. eight months (Executive Decree 2010: 2). 
Coordinating commissioner Stein also clearly stated that the human rights violations were not the CVR’s 
primary focus of the investigation.  
Comparing the CVR’s mandate with that of the CdV, which, as mentioned, conducted a non-governmental 
truth-seeking process throughout 2010 and 2011, provides further insight. As pointed out by one of the 
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members of the CdV, Craig Scott (2011: 9), while the CVR was asked to focus on a crisis associated with the 
coup and not inquire into the Lobo regime, the CdV’s primary focus was on the human rights violations, as 
recommended by the international human rights community. The CVR’s lack of focus on the rights 
violations was one of the reasons the Human Rights Platform decided to establish their own TC. 
In sum, the CVR’s mandate was limited in terms of the area of investigation. As highlighted by TC expert 
Priscilla Hayner (2011: 75), experience from e.g. Uruguay and Chile show that a narrow mandate can 
impede the effectiveness of the commission, and produce a limited version of the truth, and thus it is 
recommended that the mandate does not list specific events to be investigated, but uses a more general 
language about the kinds of violations under investigation, as it is the rights violations that should be the 
primary area of investigation. By referring to a specific event, namely the coup d’état, in the mandate, as 
well as the lack of focus on the human rights abuses, the government thus might impede the CVR’s 
effectiveness.  
 
Besides recommending that the mandate be broad and flexible with regards to the area of investigation, the 
international standards for TCs specify that this should also be the case for the period of time under 
investigation as narrow limits in the period of time under investigation can hamper the effectiveness of the 
commission’s work (cf. chapter 2.2). As mentioned, the CVR’s mandate was limited to the period between 
June 2009 and January 2010 and thus did not include the investigation of human rights violations under 
Lobo (CVR 2011a: 52), a fact that spurred criticism and disapproval from the human rights community. In 
the CVR’s report, the crisis is referred to as past (e.g. CVR 2011c: 37), even though, as was made clear in 
chapter 3, the human rights violations have continued unabated under Lobo. Hence it can easily be argued 
that Lobo’s presidential term qualifies as a key period, and that by omitting his own term from the mandate, 
Lobo contributes to making the CVR appear politically biased and untruthful. Albeit it is recommended that 
violations that occur after the commission begins its work not be part of the investigation (AI 2007: 14-16), 
the period from the establishment in January 2010 to the start of the investigation in April could easily have 
been included to avoid political bias. 
 
4.1.3 The Commissioners: Competent, Independent and Impartial? 
 
”Ultimately, no factor will more define the commission than the persons who serve as its members” 
(OHCHR 2006: 13) 
 
As was established in chapter 2.2, as with deciding to create a TC and formulating its mandate, the 
commissioners should be selected in cooperation with the public and in particular civil society, because this 
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provides transparency and leads to public support of the TC. In Honduras, president Lobo selected the 
commissioners unilaterally (cf. chapter 3.2), thus, once again, choosing not to comply with the international 
standards for TCs.  
      Furthermore, in accordance with the best practices from chapter 2.2, members of the TC should be 
selected on the basis of a) their competence, i.e. their expertise in human rights; b) their proven 
independence, i.e. without political or other bias or motives; and c) their recognized impartiality, as these 
attributes are crucially important for the effective functioning of a TC.  
      Lobo was widely criticized for his choice of commissioners, and doubts were aired about their 
competence, impartiality, and independence.  
      With regards to the commissioners’ competence, again, comparing with the CdV provides valuable 
insight. While the CdV is led by respected human rights experts and defenders, including Nobel Peace Prize 
winner Adolfo Perez Esquivel, and former president of the UN Human rights Committee Francisco José 
Aguilar Urbina (CCR n.d.), none of the members of the CVR have expertise in human rights.  
      Regarding the impartiality and independence of the commissioners, Reina Rivera, a member of the 
Honduran Human Rights Platform, expressed concern about the nationality of the international 
commissioners: 
 
We believe that the selection of the international members was made more on the basis of their 
nationalities than their competence and abilities. The representatives from Canada and Peru are not well 
looked upon in some sectors, which is why some reject the Commission, while others view it with 
reservations (Mejia 2010). 
 
These reservations regarding the commissioners from Peru and Canada are likely to stem from the fact that 
these countries were two of the quite few countries that specifically refrained from criticizing the coup and 
were sympathetic to the de facto regime of Micheletti (May I Speak Freely Media 2010a). Even though this 
does not necessarily reflect the personal opinion of the commissioners, it is interesting that Lobo would 
choose precisely those two countries. It is also interesting that Lobo would choose a Canadian commissioner 
given that Canadian mining companies are reportedly involved in problematic practices in Honduras, which 
is a highly controversial issue in Honduras (Gordon & Webber 2010). Furthermore, commissioner Kergin in 
his function as senior advisor at the Bennett Jones law firm is connected – albeit indirectly – to the 
controversial mining practices taking place in Honduras, as Bennett Jones has been part of the industry for 
decades (Bennett Jones n.d.).  
      Moreover, as mentioned, several human rights defenders argued that the national commissioners were 
key players in the Honduran power scene, affiliated with Lobo’s National Party, and supporters of the coup 
(cf. chapter 3.2). Fabia Gutierrez of COMUTRAH, when asked whether she thinks that the CVR has made a 
difference, replied: 
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No, I don’t think so, because the truth is that we don’t even know it. We don’t even know who was 
elected. And furthermore, the government of Pepe Lobo selects its own people. They are his buddies, his 
allies. So they are going to do things according to what Pepe Lobo dictates. A dictator government 
(interview Jan 2013).  
 
Zoila Lagos of APOMUH expressed a similar concern about the CVR, calling the commissioners “farce-like 
and hypocritical, like all those who supported the coup d’état (…) they are the same who today form part of 
Pepe Lobo’s cabinet” (interview Feb 2013). If these observations are in fact true, it should be cause for 
concern, as it would seriously compromise the independence of the commissioners, which is a prerequisite 
for the effective functioning of the TC. Especially the independence of commissioner Castellanos remains 
unclear, because, as mentioned in chapter 3.2, both human rights groups and supporters of the coup were 
critical of her, claiming that she was affiliated with the right and left wing, respectively.  
 
4.1.4 Public Outreach and Victim-Centered Approach? 
The period of operation of the CVR was 14 months. This is shorter than most TCs, which normally conduct 
investigations of two years or more. However, as noted, the Executive Decree (2010) stated that the CVR 
had eight months to finish, and thus the granting of a period of further six months might be seen as a 
positive. Yet, the fact that the CVR was fully financed by the international community, and that the Lobo 
government did not finance anything itself (CEJIL 2010d: 13), makes one question why the CVR was not 
simply given the two years that are recommended in order to comply with the international standards. 
 
The international standards further specify that during the investigation period, it is crucial that TCs 
effectively publicize their work. All sectors of the population in all parts of the country should know of the 
work of the TC (cf. chapter 2.2). As mentioned in chapter 3.2, in its final report, the CVR informed that it 
had held 30 informational meetings informing the public of its work, and 60 meetings with leaders in cities 
across the country. It can be argued, though, that this was not sufficient, considering the number of people in 
Honduras and the fact that many live far from the cities. As mentioned earlier, Honduran human rights 
defender Fabia Gutierrez stated that she had heard about the commission in the media, but she did not know 
what its purpose was or how it had been created (interview Jan 2013). Hence, even though it cannot be 
judged from one person’s knowledge, Gutierrez’ comment suggests that the commission’s work was not 
effectively publicized.  
 
With regards to the statement-taking, as mentioned, the CVR stated that it had a team gather approx. 280 
testimonies from witnesses and victims of human rights abuses. Furthermore it conducted around 220 
interviews with principal protagonists and key actors, and 125 collective reunions (CVR 2011a: 35, 54). It 
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sounds impressive, but in fact it is way below the 7-20.000 testimonies typically received by TCs (UN 
Secretary General 2010: 17), and – perhaps more tellingly – also much below the number of testimonies 
collected by the CdV, which amounted to 1.966 (CdV 2012: 29). While this suggests that the statement-
taking was not the CVR’s primary activity, it also becomes clear that the statement-taking was not 
particularly centered on victims, as almost half of all the testimonies heard were of key actors or principal 
protagonists. The testimonies published in the report (CVR 2011d) do not include those of victims of human 
rights violations. They only include statements from official figures. It appears that much of the 
commission’s time was spent on perpetrators. Normally, in TCs’ statement-taking, the main focus is on the 
victims (Hayner 2011: 22), which is also what the international standards (chapter 2.2) prescribe. It is 
recommended that TCs adopt a victim-centered approach, investigating all cases of human rights violations, 
and taking statements from all sectors of society (AI 2007: 34-35). Expressing skepticism about the CVR’s 
approach, Honduran human rights defender Fabia Gutierrez stated:  
 
I think that a truth commission should go from village to village (…) to those who genuinely have felt the 
impact (…) a truth commission should have the two versions both from village to village and from the 
oligarchy (…)  (interview Jan 2013).   
 
Furthermore, one should be careful not to simply believe the CVR, when it states that it took statements from 
victims and witnesses. Source criticism is important indeed, when dealing with a commission established by 
a repressive government.  
      CdV commission member Craig Scott argues that there were significant differences between the 
information gathering of the two Honduran TCs. According to Scott, the CdV, which has engaged in truth-
seeking through unofficial, independent channels, and published a 300-page report in April 2012, has taken 
several measures to abide with international standards of inclusion and victim-centering, sending teams of 
trained interviewers, psychologists, and non-Honduran security accompaniers travelling across the country to 
take testimony, informing about information gathering and encouraging people to give testimony. This, Scott 
argues, the CVR did not (Scott 2011: 6). The same is argued by the president of the Honduran women’s 
organization APOMUH, Zoila Lagos: 
 
[T]he Comisión de Verdad has done an excellent work investigating the human rights violations 
perpetrated during and after the coup d’état and that their report completely contradicts all the 
proclamations of the “comisión de verdad”, organized by the government to justify the coup and the 
violations (…) Their work is based on the investigation and their arguments are valid, they are not 
inventing nor trying to cover up the events (interview Feb 2013). 
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However, the CVR maintains that its statement-taking was based upon international standards (CVR 2011a: 
35, 46, 54). The CVR might have had problems getting the victims to testify for fear of reprisals, a problem 
noted by CdV commissioner Luis Carlos Nieto. Nieto considered that the report of the CVR would be 
incomplete because “it is missing testimonies of many victims denied a chance to speak for evident security 
reasons” (TeleSUR 2011). To this can be added that the CVR’s report was missing the perspectives of 
Zelaya, his supporters and resistance members, who did not wish to cooperate with the government’s 
commission (El Heraldo 2011).  
 
In other countries engaging in truth-seeking processes, e.g. Peru, TCs have been criticized and sought 
stopped by powerful sectors of society (UN Secretary General 2010: 24). This did not seem to be the 
problem in Honduras; on the contrary, as has been demonstrated above, the CVR was mainly criticized by 
civil society and human rights defenders. The perpetrators did not seem to perceive the CVR as a threat. In 
example, former de facto president Roberto Micheletti appeared confident and calm in his testimony before 
the CVR (CVR 2011b: 126), even though it is widely known that he was one of the protagonists in the coup 
and the following human rights violations. This could be interpreted as a symbol of the character of the 
CVR. That it might not have been a completely sincere attempt at providing justice for the Honduran people.  
 
Finally, the international standards (chapter 2.2) recommend that public hearings be held, inter alia to give 
the victims a chance to tell their story publicly, inspire a national discussion about the past, and inspire 
reconciliation. As noted in chapter 2.3, the theory holds that a restorative justice approach can allow the 
victims to heal and thus enable reconciliation. Such an approach presupposes, besides from the full truth, 
giving the victims a chance to tell their story and recognizing their experiences. Only thus can they begin to 
heal and forgive. For this reason I argue that the approach of the CVR, which it appears was more centered 
on perpetrators than victims, and did not engage in public hearings – i.e. did not follow the principle of 
inclusion – cannot be expected to inspire reconciliation; a fact that limits the CVR’s prospects for preventing 
future human rights.  
 
4.1.5 Recommendations and Broadcasting of Results? 
As noted in chapter 3.2, the CVR’s final report concluded that during the coup and the Micheletti rule, 
multiple human rights violations had occurred in the form of deprivation of liberty, torture, rape, political 
persecution and at least 20 violent deaths at the hands of the security officials.  
      The CVR’s conclusions on the extent of the human rights violations were vague compared to the CdV’s. 
As set forward in the commission’s mandate, the timeframe of the report only comprises the period from the 
day of the coup to the day of the inauguration of president Lobo, thus reaching a much lower number of 
victims than the CdV, which documented more than 5.400 human rights violations between June 2009 and 
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August 2011 (CdV 2012: 228). The different numbers probably also reflect a more rigorous commitment on 
part of the CdV to collect testimonies from the victims, and not so much from perpetrators and protagonists 
of the coup.  
 
As noted in chapter 2, TCs can contribute to securing the right to truth, reparation and justice by making 
recommendations to the government. In chapter 3.2 we saw that in its final report, the CVR gave 24 
recommendations in the area of human rights. With regards to satisfying the right to truth, the CVR 
recommended the following measures: 
 
The State of Honduras must publically acknowledge that the authorities and agents committed human 
rights violations, apologize to the victims and promise them and society that such violations shall not be 
repeated. The State of Honduras must provide to the victims of human rights violations, or to their loved 
ones, the information that is in the possession of the state security forces on them [the victims] and 
disclose how it has been used (emphasis added) (CVR 2011b: 40). 
 
As a matter of satisfying the right to justice, the CVR recommended that the Honduran government should 
investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for the human rights violations that took place in the 
mandated period, between June 28, 2009 and January 27, 2010:  
 
The State of Honduras in fulfillment of its international obligations must investigate, try and punish all 
human rights violations, which took place from June 28, 2009 to January 27, 2010, as well as the 
responsibility of the persons identified as the main perpetrators of the violations, without excluding 
the highest levels of responsibility and without undue delay, and should ensure all protections of due 
process for the accused persons (…) (emphasis added) (CVR 2011b: 38). 
 
Concerning the victims’ right to reparation, the CVR recommended that the following steps be 
taken: 
 
The Government and National Congress of Honduras must publically pledge to the victims to redress 
them for the damage that its agents caused them, under standards of restitution, indemnification, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non repetition, and should establish a national reparation 
plan to ensure full redress of the victims (…) The Government and Judiciary must ensure full 
reparation to the victims (…) The State of Honduras must take measures of public acknowledgement 
of the victims individually and collectively, such as naming public facilities, monuments or 
commemorative plaques or other appropriate things after them (emphasis added) (CVR 2011b: 39). 
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Finally, the CVR further recommended measures to be taken by the state in order to prevent further human 
rights violations and comply with international human rights standards. These included, among others, the 
public recognition of human right defenders and the importance of their work; the strengthening of the police 
force by e.g. providing education in human rights, prohibiting torture and regulating the use of tear gas; and 
the compliance with Convention No. 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO), i.e. non-
discrimination of indigenous peoples and their territories (CVR 2011b: 40-41).  
 
As becomes clear when looking at the emphases above, the CVR recognized the need for addressing the 
victims’ and society’s right to truth, justice and reparation, and consequently, the commission set forward 
recommendations to satisfy these rights. By recommending these measures the CVR complied with 
international TC standards and human rights law, at least to some extent. The satisfaction of the rights was 
still compromised by the limited area under investigation. Also, while recommendations are important, there 
is no guarantee that the government will follow up and implement them. The recommendations of a TC, a 
temporary body with little authority, can be easily ignored (Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010: 12). I will return to this 
issue in chapter 4.3.  
 
Did the CVR sufficiently broadcast its results? A report summarizing the main findings and 
recommendations was released, thus complying with international recommendations to do so in order to 
make the report more accessible to the public. The international standards (chapter 2.2) further prescribe that 
in order for the report to have an impact, the full report should be dispersed as widely as possible, through 
the distribution of free copies and making it available online. The summary report was published in at least 
one newspaper16, and the commission had a webpage: www.cvr.hn, which contained the full report and 
information on the commission. Yet today the commission’s webpage has been shut down, making it less 
available to the public, and questioning the transparency of the commission’s work. In order to locate the 
report online, one needs to do some detective work. The full report is still available at the Secretariat for 
Justice and Human Rights’ webpage though. As noted, Honduran human rights defenders Zoila Lagos and 
Fabia Gutierrez both expressed that they did not know much of the CVR, though stating that they had heard 
about it in the medias (interviews Jan, Feb 2013). It is possible that this reflects the average knowledge of the 
CVR among Hondurans, and thus that the CVR did not effectively publicize its report. However, it is 
difficult to say for sure. Nonetheless, it appears as if the CVR’s work could have been publicized in a more 
extensive manner, and it is safe to say that by closing down the commission’s website, the broadcasting of 
the results becomes somewhat limited.  
 
 
                                                      
16 La Tribuna, 8 Jul 2011, pp. 85-94. 
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4.1.6 Conclusions 
In sum, the government and the CVR failed to comply with the international standards for TCs. The 
president made unilateral decisions, leading to a weak, narrow and inflexible mandate. The focus was 
misplaced, focusing more on the political circumstances of the coup than the human rights violations. Instead 
of applying a victim-centered approach, the CVR spent much time on perpetrators. The degree of public 
involvement and broadcasting of results was questionable. Lobo’s choice of commissioners received 
criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. Among human rights groups there was agreement that 
Lobo was handpicking his own people – people who were not qualified to be part of the TC – in order to 
deliberately obstruct the truth-seeking process. In its recommendations, however, the CVR properly reflected 
the state’s obligations to secure the right to truth, justice and reparation, thus preparing the ground for state 
compliance with international human rights law.  
      What do these findings mean for the CVR’s contribution to improving the rights of the Honduran 
people? I will address this question below.  
 
 
4.2 The CVR’s Impact on Human Rights  
In order to thoroughly answer the research question of to what extent the Honduran truth-seeking process is 
likely to contribute to improved human rights, it is necessary to analyze it both from a backward-looking and 
a forward-looking perspective. A TC can make a difference for human rights in two very interconnected 
ways: 1) by satisfying the right to truth, justice and reparation for past violations, and 2) by contributing to a 
future with less human rights violations. 
 
4.2.1 Addressing the Past Abuses: The Right to Truth, Justice and Reparation  
Via its international commitments, the state of Honduras is obliged to refrain from interfering with or 
limiting human rights, protect its citizens from human rights abuses, and take positive action to enable the 
enjoyment of human rights (UN n.d.; IACHR 2012: 349). Honduras is party to several international legal 
treaties that protect these rights and outline these duties, e.g. the UDHR, the ACHR and the ICCPR. In 
chapter 3 it became clear that the Honduran state has failed to live up to these obligations in the period since 
the coup d’état. As a consequence of the coup d’état, Hondurans’ rights were grossly violated, and for this 
reason the Honduran state is obliged to a) secure the right to truth, i.e. establish the facts about violations of 
human rights that occurred in the past; b) secure the right to justice, i.e. investigate past violations and, if 
there is sufficient evidence, prosecute the suspected perpetrators; and c) secure the right to reparation, i.e. 
provide full and effective reparation to the victims and their families, in five forms: restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.  
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      Has the CVR contributed to fulfilling the Honduran state’s obligations under international human rights 
law? I will start by analyzing to what extent the CVR secured the Honduran people’s right to know the truth.  
 
4.2.1.1 A Truthful Truth Commission? 
As was made clear in chapter 2.1, according to international human rights law, people have the right to know 
the truth about the gross violations of human rights that took place in their country’s past. The right to the 
truth entails knowing the causes, conditions and circumstances surrounding the violations; the progress and 
results of the investigation; the fate and whereabouts of disappeared or murdered victims; and the identity of 
the perpetrators (OHCHR 2006b: 5, 11).  
      As has been pointed out by CEJIL (2010d: 7), in Honduras, the people’s right to the truth was 
compromised from the start, because the victims and civil society were not invited to take part in the 
establishment of the CVR, and thus had no say in the formulation of the mandate. The right to the truth was 
further compromised by the fact that during the investigation, many victims and important sectors of civil 
society were still excluded from the process. The focus was to a large degree on the key actors of the coup, 
which was also underlined by the fact that the human rights violations were not the commission’s primary 
object of investigation. Rasmussen (2011) argues that the conclusions of the CVR’s final report have 
credibility issues, because the investigation was limited to the period before the inauguration of president 
Lobo. After studying the report, it is my impression that the CVR conducted a comprehensive analysis of the 
mandated area of investigation. The problem is rather that the focus was misplaced to the political 
circumstances surrounding the coup, while it should have had a more clear focus on the human rights 
violations. Many of the rights violations were never documented, which is clear by looking at the number of 
violations documented by the CdV, which by far exceeded that of the CVR. Knowledge of the whereabouts 
of victims was not provided. This did not seem to be a priority of the CVR.  
      The right to the truth, both in its collective and individual form, was also compromised by the 
classification of the most sensitive documents, which will not be made available to the public for ten years 
(Mejia 2010; Executive Decree 2010). In article 14, the Executive Decree creating the CVR specifies that 
after submitting its final report, the commission must “select and separate those documents and materials 
that are confidential in nature” and transfer them for safe-keeping, “without revealing their contents for ten 
years” (Executive Decree 2010: 4). International human rights law determines that the truth should be 
treated as an inalienable and non-derogable right, and not be subjected to any form of limitation (OHCHR 
2006b: 14-15), hence the classification of documents, as well as the fact that the commission chose not to 
name names, in this way taking away the victims’ right to know the identity of their perpetrators, was a 
violation of the right to the truth. One can argue that what was produced by the CVR was a limited truth.  
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The insecurity that dominates Honduran society may have also affected the right to the truth. According to 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010: 147, 149), in a country plagued by violence and crime it is more difficult to 
collect evidence, because a) the TC’s freedom of action is limited (maybe it abstains from visiting violent 
areas), b) government and military officials may hold back information for fear of embarrassing or 
compromising details that could hurt them politically or personally, and c) it complicates the process of 
interviewing witnesses, because they are likely to be more reluctant to cooperate for fear of retaliation. This 
challenging context makes it even more likely that the CVR has produced an incomplete truth.  
 
Clearly, it is difficult to determine what constitutes the real truth because “[h]ow one understands history is 
a function of how one experienced that history” (Andrieu 2010: 17). There will always be different versions 
of the truth, and it is rarely objective. In post-conflict divided societies especially, it is often very difficult for 
citizens to agree on what exactly constitutes the truth, and how, then, can you ever reach an official version 
of the truth (Andrieu 2010: 17-18)? However, it is important to distinguish between knowledge and 
acknowledgment. Acknowledgement implies that the state has admitted its wrongs, and recognized the 
suffering they inflicted (Hayner 2011: 21). Such acknowledgement is more vital than a mere knowledge of 
the crimes, as it can aid victims to come to terms with their past (Reddy 2004: 20), and thus enable 
reconciliation (cf. chapter 2.3). In the Honduras case, neither was the result. The full truth was not known, as 
the repression continued, without being subject of investigation. The government has not admitted its 
wrongs. The commission only concluded that the Micheletti regime had done wrong. Hence the Honduran 
people have not received acknowledgement for their suffering either. There is a need for an official 
acknowledgement of the repressive practices, namely because the government tries to disguise the true 
nature of its regime. In Hayner’s (2011: 21) words, “[o]fficial acknowledgement can be powerful precisely 
because official denial can be so pervasive”. 
 
4.2.1.2 The Right to Justice 
Honduras’ former human rights commissioner Leo Valladares has remarked that the Hondurans have “a 
thirst for justice and truth” (Mejia 2010). The violations in Honduras may appear insignificant when 
comparing to those of other countries that have experienced e.g. genocide, such as Honduras’ neighboring 
country Guatemala. However, as accentuated by Hayner (2011: 17), the actual number of victims does not 
determine the intensity of the interest in justice. When asked whether she considers it important that those 
who caused the conflict be made responsible, Honduran human rights defender Zoila Lagos replied: “Of 
course. Even though justice arrives late, it is always good that the guilty pay for their insults against the 
people” (interview Feb 2013). Another Honduran human rights defender, Fabia Gutierrez, shared the same 
desire for justice: “Our dream, we who oppose the coup (…) we think that many people should be imprisoned 
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(…) And those who carried out the coup should pay for their crime with prison because it was a cruel coup 
and a crime against the Hondurans” (interview Jan 2013). 
 
In chapter 2.1 I noted that international human rights law stipulates that states must investigate into 
violations of human rights and ensure that those responsible are prosecuted, tried, and duly punished 
(UNCHR 2005: 12). As mentioned, the CVR made these obligations known in its recommendations, but is 
the right to justice likely to be satisfied in post-coup Honduras?  
      As noted in chapter 2.3, TCs can contribute to securing the right to justice by instigating further 
backward-looking measures such as trials, and replacement of corrupt judges and security officials. TCs can 
do this by locating credible evidence indicating responsibility, and either name the names of the perpetrators 
in the final report or forward the evidence to the relevant prosecution authorities for further investigation, 
thus initiating criminal proceedings. Even though naming the guilty involves a dilemma, because the 
perpetrators have the right to due process, Hayner (2011: 121) argues that naming the names of the 
perpetrators is part of the truth-telling process – part of the full truth. And this “naming and shaming” 
approach is especially important in countries where the judicial system does not function well, which means 
that there is little chance of a trial. The international human rights community places more importance on the 
rights of the perpetrators, recommending that identities may be kept confidential from the public, but should 
still be handed over to the judicial authorities to secure that justice is made (cf. chapter 2.2). This shows the 
tensions that can emerge between truth and justice. 
      The CVR’s report did not name the perpetrators that were behind the coup; neither did it indicate who 
should be made responsible for the political assassinations (Rasmussen 2011). It did recommend, however, 
that the government investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for the human rights violations that 
took place in the mandated period, between June 28, 2009 and January 27, 2010 (CVR 2011b: 38), 
indicating that the evidence had been forwarded to the prosecution authorities. But does this mean that trials 
will result? 
 
Hayner (2011: 22-23) sets forward the argument that “[w]here there is a functioning judicial system, 
sufficient evidence, and sufficient political will, trials may result”. Based on this argument I argue that it is 
highly unlikely that trials will result in Honduras.  
      First of all, as noted in chapter 3.2, the Honduran judicial system is characterized by weaknesses such as 
corruption and lack of independence that implicate with the proper protection of human rights in the country 
(CEJIL 2010e; Demers 2013). The IACHR and HRW have reported harassment, dismissal, and even 
assassination of judges who expressed opposition to the coup. Thus the independence of the judiciary is 
threatened.  
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      Second of all, several circumstances point to the CVR not having access to sufficient evidence. As 
mentioned above, the FNRP did not wish to cooperate with the commission (El Heraldo 2011). Also, as 
pointed out by CEJIL (2010d: 11), the founding Executive Decree did obligate the judiciary or the legislature 
to hand over information to the CVR. Only the executive branch was obliged to do so. Besides inflicting the 
right to justice, this also compromises the right to the truth.  
      Third of all, many factors point to insufficient political will to prosecute the perpetrators. In October 
2011, the Honduran Supreme Court overwhelmingly ruled against the prosecution of six army generals who 
had been charged with the overthrow of Zelaya, a decision that, as noted by Freedom House (2013), makes it 
highly dubious that any of the coup instigators or human rights violators will be held responsible for their 
crimes. The right to justice in Honduras is compromised by the fact that the Lobo administration, the 
legislative and the judiciary, include many of the official and military figures that took part in, or legitimized, 
the coup, and many of them have been selected directly by Lobo (Joya 2010: 20). This makes it unlikely that 
they will be willing to secure the victims’ right to justice.  
      At the end of 2012, no one had been brought to justice for the human rights violations that have taken 
place in Honduras since the coup, not even for the murders, nor had the members of the judiciary, who were 
dismissed in questionable proceedings, been returned to their posts (AI 2012). Powerful perpetrators around 
the world have repeatedly managed to avoid being judged for their crimes, and a TC has sometimes 
functioned as a useful compromise to the demand for justice (Hayner 2011: 91), which is why some scholars 
are skeptical of TCs, and call for the application of criminal justice. In a meeting concerning the 
establishment of the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission in 1994, the Guatemalan minister of 
defense said: “We are fully in support of a truth commission (…) Just like in Chile: truth, but no trials” 
(ibid), demonstrating the danger of TCs being used as a way of avoiding more serious accountability.  
      Bertha Oliva, president of COFADEH, underlines the problem by stating that the people responsible for 
investigating and prosecuting human rights violations are all members of the post-coup government, and thus 
more interested in supporting the government than uncovering the truth and securing justice for the victims. 
For this reason, as argued by COFADEH, the investigation and prosecution of human rights violations must 
be carried out by individuals who were not part of the coup or part of the post-coup government (Ashby 
2010). An independent judiciary is essential for securing the Hondurans’ right to justice. 
      Another factor that points to a limited will on behalf of the Lobo administration to prosecute the 
perpetrators is the passing of the Amnesty Decree, which was approved by the National Congress and signed 
by Lobo in January 2010. The Amnesty Decree granted amnesty for coup-related political and common 
crimes, thus protecting those responsible for the events that occurred between January 2008 and January 
2010 from prosecution (CEJIL 2010d: 2; Amnesty Decree 2010). Former de facto president Micheletti was 
named “congressman for life”, a move that barred him from prosecution, and trial processes against military 
officers with roles in the coup were terminated (CEJIL 2010a). Even though the Amnesty Decree stated that 
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human rights violations were exempt from the amnesty, it used a very ambiguous language and lacked 
precise criteria for its application, e.g. it approved amnesty for “political crimes” and conduct of a “terrorist 
nature” without clearly defining the scope of these; a fact that caused concern that it could be applied in an 
abusive manner (IACHR 2010c; Shore 2010). The Americas Director of HRW, José Miguel Vivanco, called 
for the rejection of the Amnesty Decree, stating that it would “flout Honduras’ obligation to ensure that all 
victims of rights violations can obtain a remedy, and set a precedent for granting impunity to abusers” 
(HRW 2009). The IACHR also rejected the amnesty, noting that such laws contravene the obligation of the 
Honduran state as party to the ACHR. As noted in chapter 2.1, amnesty laws are considered unacceptable 
under international human rights law because in the past they have obstructed the clarification of serious 
human rights abuses, and the punishment of those responsible (IACHR 2010c). The IACtHR reacted to 
Lobo’s issuance of the Amnesty Decree in the following way:  
 
States may not invoke existing provisions of domestic law, such as an amnesty decree, to avoid 
complying with their obligations under international law. Thus, Honduras may not use the Amnesty 
Decree to justify its failure to prosecute and punish human rights violations (Shore 2010). 
 
The state is thus required to ensure that the Amnesty Decree does not intervene with the victims’ right to 
justice. However, it should be noted that some scholars argue that amnesties are essential for improving 
human rights because they neutralize spoilers from the old regime, and thus have a stabilizing effect. Yet, 
still others argue that it is essential that amnesties be combined with trials, as this provides a “justice 
balance” that affects positively on human rights (Olsen et al. 2010). 
 
In sum, it appears that the CVR is not very likely to lead to satisfaction of the right to justice in Honduras. It 
refrained from assigning responsibility in its report, and it seems that there is not sufficient political will to 
move forward with the evidence produced. Official steps strengthening impunity suggest that powerful 
forces still oppose any form of accountability (CEJIL 2010a). The National Congress’ passing of the 
Amnesty Decree and the lack of action from the judiciary suggest that these branches are in no way 
independent from the executive branch. The fact that Honduras lacks a functioning and independent judicial 
and legislative system further reduces the likeliness of fulfillment of the right to justice through trials and 
reforms. Furthermore, the right to justice, as the right to truth, is sure to be compromised by the limited 
period under investigation.  
 
The Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission finished its work in 1999 (Hayner 2011: 32), and only 
just this month – fourteen years after – was the retired general José Efraín Ríos Montt made accountable for 
the genocide and crimes against humanity in Guatemala in the 1980s, and received his sentence: 80 years in 
prison (CEJIL 2013). Like the CVR, the Historical Clarification Commission specifically chose not to name 
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names of perpetrators, only stating that the massive human rights crimes “occurred with the knowledge or by 
order of the highest authorities of the State” (Hayner 2011: 135). Yet, rights activists have used this 
information to continuously bring charges against the highest government authorities of the worst period of 
violence, submitting the Commission’s report to back up their case, which as we have now seen, paid off in 
the end. The historical sentence in Guatemala can be interpreted as proof that after many years a TC may 
have an effect on the right to justice. 
      However, the case of Guatemala also shows the limitations of a TC report to satisfy the right to justice 
when perpetrators are not named. Had the Guatemalan TC named names, the rights community might have 
had a stronger case against Ríos Montt, and it would not have taken fourteen years until he was brought to 
justice. Such a scenario could emerge in Honduras as well, especially because the most sensitive files will 
not be made available to the public before the year 2020. 
 
4.2.1.3 The Right to Reparation 
As was established in chapter 2.1, under international human rights law, victims of gross human rights 
violations have the right to be provided with full and effective reparation, ideally in the areas of restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition, and in chapter 2.2 it was noted 
that TCs can contribute to securing the right to reparation by making recommendations concerning this right 
in its final report. In chapter 4.1.5 we saw that the CVR recommended reparations in accordance with the 
international human rights law and standards. But has the government acted upon these recommendations? 
In 2012, the Honduran state created a follow-up institution to monitor the implementation of the 
recommendations made by the CVR: the Unit for Follow-up of the CVR’s Recommendations (USCVR) 
under the Secretariat for Justice and Human Rights (La Tribuna 2012), thus complying with the international 
recommendations to do so. In a USCVR report published in June 2012, however, it becomes clear that, at 
least at the point of publication, the recommendations in the area of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
and satisfaction had not yet been addressed.  
The government’s failure to follow up on the recommendations for reparation might originate in financial 
troubles. Honduras, which already before the coup was one of Latin America’s poorest countries, lost 
approx. 50 million U.S. dollars a day in frozen international aid and loans in the months following the coup 
(D’Ambrosio 2009). This, combined with poor financial management, has left the government in severe 
financial strains. It recently lost budget support from the World Bank after a standby agreement with the IMF 
was not renewed, and it has now turned to borrowing in the expensive local market (The Economist 2013). 
What makes it worse is the fact that the population is growing fast, as every year Honduras receives around 
25.000 deportees from the U.S., many of whom are criminals, placing further strain on the economy (Demers 
2013). Thus, even if there is sufficient political will, there may not be sufficient funds to undertake the 
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recommended measures. However, while recognizing that the government may not be in a position to 
provide financial reparations, it is important to note that reparations can also be symbolic, and the CVR did 
recommend that the state take measures of “public acknowledgement of the victims individually and 
collectively, such as naming public facilities, monuments or commemorative plaques or other appropriate 
things after them” (CVR 2011b: 39). Nonetheless, this does not seem to have been a priority for the 
government.  
 
As with truth and justice, the victims’ right to reparation is also compromised by the fact that the CVR’s 
mandate was limited to the period from June 2009 to January 2010, and thus recommended reparation only 
for the violation that took place in this period. This means that not all victims’ right to reparation is 
respected.  
      With regards to reparation in the form of guarantees of non-reoccurrence, the government has followed 
up, to some degree. This, I will elaborate on in chapter 4.2.2.  
 
4.2.2 Towards a Less Abusive Future? 
As part of its obligation to secure the right to reparation, the state is also obliged to take necessary steps to 
prevent a recurrence of violations (cf. chapter 2.1). As noted by Hayner (2011: 182), perhaps one of the most 
important aims of a TC should be to prevent further human rights violations in the future. In theory, TCs can 
contribute to this aim by prompting institutional reform and fostering reconciliation (cf. chapter 2.3).  
 
4.2.2.1 Institutional Reforms  
The CVR recommended several reforms to protect future human rights (see chapter 4.1.5), some of which 
the government has begun implementing: 
• In 2010, the government created the Secretariat for Justice and Human Rights to promote, coordinate, 
craft, harmonize, implement and evaluate policies in the area of justice and human rights (IACHR 2012: 
381).  
• The USCVR reports that the state has complied with the recommendation to publically recognize human 
right defenders and the importance of their work (USCVR 2012: 18).  
• The government has begun vetting the police through a police reform program, which has led to many 
officers being fired, and even more leaving voluntarily. The aim is for a police force that is both larger 
and better trained (The Economist 2013).  
 
While it is positive that some steps are being taken, follow-up is slow, which is worrying, as prompt action in 
needed to address the rights of the Hondurans. As pointed out by Adriana Beltrán, senior associate for citizen 
security at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), considering the financial constraints that the 
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government faces, Honduras needs outside help to fund its reforms (Demers 2013). What is most troubling, 
perhaps, is the government’s failure to follow up on the CVR’s recommendation to comply with Convention 
No. 169 of the ILO, i.e. non-discrimination of indigenous peoples and their territories (CVR 2011b: 40-41). 
Considering the escalation of the violence and repression in the Bajo Aguán, which international 
organizations consider to be “the most severe in terms of the degree of violence committed against peasants 
in Central America over the past 15 years” (FIAN International et al. 2012), the fact that the government has 
failed to address this situation, is concerning.  
 
4.2.2.2 Reconciliation 
Not all TCs aim at promoting reconciliation (Reddy 2004: 21), but the Honduran CVR did. In its report the 
CVR stated the following: 
 
We, the commissioners, hand over to the people of Honduras a report that is objective, consistent, 
substantiated, and centered in the hope of serving to build bridges towards reconciliation, as affirmed by 
Desmond Tutu: “There cannot be reconciliation without justice and without reconciliation there is no 
future” (CVR 2011a: 36). 
 
Many observers, myself included, have noted the pervasive polarization that characterizes Honduran society 
today (cf. chapter 3.2), underlining the need for reconciliation of the Honduran people. As noted in chapter 
2.3, in theory, TCs contribute to improving future human rights by fostering reconciliation. Reconciliation is 
promoted through a restorative justice approach that allows the perpetrators to acknowledge their deeds and 
apologize, thus repairing the harms caused to the victims, so they can begin to heal and forgive.  
Generally, TC processes have produced disappointing results with regards to reconciling the conflicting 
parties, and their potential to do so has been disputed by many scholars (e.g. Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010; 
Andrieu 2010). In fact, only one TC has been accredited with actually achieving this goal, to some extent, 
and that is the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (ICTJ 2008c).  
      However, the South African truth-seeking process was much different from the one that took place in 
Honduras. The TRC, which was set up in 1995 to deal with the violations that took place during apartheid, 
was one of the most ambitious TCs to ever exist. Unlike many other TCs, the TRC did not operate behind 
closed doors. It conducted an open process with 2.000 public testimonies as well as permitted press and 
television reports leading to extensive media coverage and public debate. The victims were invited into the 
process via the public hearings. It was a comprehensive process of total transparency, which contributed to 
educating the new post-apartheid society directly, thus changing the human rights norms (Hayner 2011: 28). 
Furthermore, the TRC applied an amnesty-for-truth approach, granting amnesty to perpetrators who publicly 
admitted the full truth about their deeds. Thus, the methodology of the TRC enabled restorative justice for 
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the victims17 (cf. chapter 2.3). The TRC set a high standard for TCs, because it showed what such 
commissions could do if provided with a broad mandate and when setting extensive goals (eds. Rotberg & 
Thompson 2000: 4-5). Yet, when comparing the South African process with the Honduran, it is clear that 
there were significant differences. As argued earlier, the Honduran CVR was not a victim-centered process. 
It did not allow media coverage of its testimonies. Nor did it name names, leaving the victims to “reconcile” 
with unknown individuals. The process did not play out as a societal education process as it is argued that the 
South African process did. In Honduras, the public was not even involved in deciding the mandate of the 
CVR, nor did they get the chance to provide inputs to the selection of the commissioners. Also, a significant 
difference between the South African and the Honduran experience is that in South Africa, new leaders had 
been elected by the people – black leaders – while in Honduras, the same oligarchy remains in power, and 
Lobo was elected in elections considered by many Hondurans to be illegitimate.  
 
I argue that the Honduran truth-seeking process is unlikely to foster reconciliation for three further reasons.  
      First of all, as argued in chapter 4.2.1, the truth produced by the CVR was a limited truth. And a limited 
truth is unlikely to lead to reconciliation of the Honduran people. As stressed by CEJIL, “[a] truth 
commission of the type Honduras needs must advance – without restrictions – all aspects of the truth, 
including the facts, circumstances, context, and the responsibilities” (CEJIL 2010d: 7). In order to get past 
the polarization that characterizes Honduran society, and move towards reconciliation, the full truth needs to 
be told.  
      Second of all, in chapter 4.2.1 as well, I argued that the CVR is not likely to secure the Honduran 
people’s right to justice. In theory, criminal justice does not lead to reconciliation; for this a restorative 
justice approach is needed. Thus, the fact that the state has not taken measures towards securing the right to 
justice could in theory be positive for reconciliation. However, as was argued in chapter 4.1.4, the restorative 
justice approach that is required for this to happen has not been applied in the Honduran truth-seeking 
process.  
      Finally, the failure to include the Honduran public, victims, civil society and the resistance in the truth-
seeking process is likely to provoke further polarization in society, rather than reconciliation.  
For all these reasons, reconciliation does not appear to be very likely in Honduras.  
 
4.2.3 Conclusions   
Because of a limited and misdirected mandate, the CVR is unlikely to contribute to full truth, justice and 
reparation. The right to the truth is further compromised by the classification of delicate documents, the 
                                                      
17 This shows the tensions that can emerge between justice and reconciliation. While amnesties are believed by some to 
be essential for improving human rights via truth commissions (Olsen et al. 2010), others stress that amnesties obstruct 
the rule of law as they take away the victims’ right to justice (e.g. UNCHR 2005: 14). 
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refrainment from naming names, and an insecure setting that may have complicated the statement-taking 
process. The victims have not been acknowledged for their suffering.  
      The right to justice is not likely to be met in Honduras, for several reasons: a) the CVR did not assign 
responsibility in its report; b) the CVR had restricted access to evidence; c) there appears to be insufficient 
political will to prosecute; d) the Honduran system is characterized by significant weaknesses such as a lack 
of independence of the legislative and judicial branches of government; and e) to this day, no one has been 
brought to justice for the human rights violations.   
      The right to reparation has not been satisfied, and is perhaps compromised by the fact that the Honduran 
state is in the midst of a financial crisis. There has been some follow-up on the recommended reforms, but it 
is weak and slow. Because of the perpetrator-centered, non-transparent, and non-consultative approach of the 
CVR, it is unlikely to contribute to reconciliation of Hondurans.  
      In sum, the holistic approach to transitional justice, which is recommended by scholars and the 
international human rights community alike, has not been adopted by the Honduran state. The specific 
combination of trials and amnesties that recent studies have shown to be beneficial for human rights, has not 
been adopted by the Honduran state. It appears that the CVR is not very likely to lead to an improvement of 
human rights in Honduras. 
 
 
4.3 The Role of the Honduran Government  
 
“The government has presented it to us as if it were the ultimate panacea, but the experience of the coup 
helped us to know the double standards and the double discourse of the politicians” 
(Zoila Lagos, interview Feb 2013) 
 
In the end, as pointed out by Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010: 145, 147), TCs have generally had little impact on 
human rights on their own. Due to their limited powers and their temporary nature, their impact is dependent 
on outside factors. The decision to adopt further additional transitional justice measures such as reparation 
programs and trials is ultimately up to the government.  
 
It can be argued that Lobo has taken some steps towards reconciling the political divide that has 
characterized Honduras since the coup, and thus taken positive action to enable the enjoyment of future 
human rights. Among these steps are the establishment of the CVR, and the mentioned implementation of 
some of the CVR’s recommended reforms. Another step is Lobo stating his support for the party Libre, 
which was formed in 2010 by the FNRP, and its participation in the coming presidential election in 
November. Yet another step is Lobo admitting that the events of June 28 constituted a coup, and his support 
 59 
for the return of Zelaya to Honduras from his exile in the Dominican Republic (May I Speak Freely Media 
2010b). The US ambassador to Honduras, Hugo Llorens, has applauded Lobo administration for these steps, 
and accused minority groups on the left and right of obstructing the advancement of national reconciliation 
(May I Speak Freely Media 2010b).  
      Other observers, however, view the Lobo government’s actions with reservation, as they point to 
circumstances that undermine the government’s actions (Lackey 2010). COFADEH argues: 
 
The creation of commissions, committees and ministries is an attempt to control [discourse and practice 
surrounding] human rights in Honduras from the office of the president; to bring in international financial 
resources and foment political clientelism. It also functions to establish the perception among the 
international community that in Honduras transparency exists and that the current government has 
external legitimacy (COFADEH 2010). 
 
In 2012, the IACHR stated that, “the IACHR observes with concern the high rate of non-compliance with the 
recommendations issued by the CVR” (IACHR 2012: 344). In June 2012, out of the 84 recommendations 
made by the CVR, only 13 had been implemented. Of the 24 recommendations made in the area of human 
rights, only six had been addressed (USCVR 2012: 17). In its June 2012 report, the USCVR expressed 
concern about the severely delayed execution of the recommendations and the disinterest on part of the state 
in following up on the CVR’s investigation (IACHR 2012: 382). Despite some reforms being implemented, 
the rather weak implementation record leads to doubts about whether the government is going to follow up 
on the recommendations.  
      This may be due to, as mentioned in chapter 2.3, according to Grodsky (2007), TCs are not always 
sincere attempts at addressing the rights of the citizens. Some governments have used TCs instrumentally to 
advance their own interests. It is my argument that this was the case in Honduras, based on the following 
factors: 
      Firstly, as noted in chapter 1, the most common situation is that TCs emerge in a transition period from 
authoritarian rule, or civil war, to post-conflict democracy. However, the Honduras case is special, because it 
may be argued that the Honduras experience was “reversed”, meaning that instead of transitioning from a 
state of repressive rule to democracy, Honduras, via the coup d’état, went from being a democracy, to 
becoming a repressive regime. This is debatable though, because some argue that Zelaya was on his way to 
becoming an autocrat (Pérez-Stable 2009). Nevertheless, based on the findings from chapter 3.1.2, it is safe 
to argue that the CVR was established during repressive rule. In fact, human rights conditions and repression 
even worsened in Lobo’s term, while the CVR was in operation. Former Costa Rican vice president Kevin 
Casas-Zamora, when stating his concern about the legitimacy of the CVR, noted that, ”[t]he problem is that 
the people who staged the coup won in this case. Whether we like it or not, they are in power” (May I Speak 
Freely Media 2010b). Grodsky (2007: 288) argues that the level of political control enjoyed by old elites in 
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the system is significant, because “[i]n states where old elites rule with overwhelming control (…) they 
should be most comfortable launching a carefully controlled process with practically no fear of past events 
escaping the official domain”. The circumstance that the old elites comfortably continue to dominate the 
political scene in Honduras, which has been noted by many, should thus be cause for concern. 
      Secondly, as was remarked in chapter 3, at the time of the establishment of the CVR, the Honduran state 
was under serious financial pressure because of the condemnation from many countries. Honduras, as many 
other developing countries, is severely dependent on international aid, and thus foreign relations are utterly 
important for the country. Furthermore, the state faced considerable external pressure to improve the human 
rights situation in the country. I argue that the solution found by the Lobo administration was to comply with 
the international pressure from the OAS and the U.S. to launch a TC, because it was a move that improved 
Honduras’ standing in the eyes of the international community, and normalized relations with important 
donors such as the U.S. Grodsky (2007: 288) argues that “[t]he possibility of external payoffs for both new 
and old repressive elites is indistinguishable. Moreover, as the degree of repression climbs, external actors 
may actually be more inclined to accept symbolic concessions in exchange for these payoffs”. Thus I argue 
that based on foreign relations-related and financial incentives the Lobo administration launched a weak and 
carefully controlled TC process, aimed at regaining the support of the international community, without the 
risk of losing influence over political decisions.  
      I base my argument on the findings I have made throughout the study: a) that the CVR was established 
during repressive rule (chapter 3.1.2), b) that the mandate, powers and activities of the CVR were limited 
and did not live up to international human rights law and standards for TCs (chapter 4.1), and c) that the 
government, neither the executive, legislative nor the judicial branch, has demonstrated the will to conduct 
any serious follow-up on the recommendations of the CVR or made any sincere attempt at promoting 
reconciliation (chapter 4.2).  
 
In chapter 2.2.1 I noted that the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights stresses that a country is not ripe 
for a TC until the violent conflict or the repressive practices have come to an end, and until there is the 
political will to conduct a serious inquiry into past abuses. Based on the discoveries from throughout the 
study it can consequently be argued that Honduras was simply not ready for a TC. For this reason it can 
further be argued that the U.S. and the OAS should not have pressured for a TC in Honduras while 
repression was still going on. The OAS was well aware of the critical human rights situation in Honduras, as 
the IACHR has written more comprehensive reports on the situation than any other organization.  Moreover, 
the UN should not have provided financial support for the CVR, as this action contradicted its own standard 
prescribing that a TC should not be established until the country is ready for it. 
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Based on my findings, I argue that there is little chance of the CVR contributing to any improvements in 
human rights, neither the right to truth, justice, reparations, or a less abuse future. A weak investigation 
hindered the full disclosure of the truth, and the state is unlikely to engage in any further transitional justice 
measures as follow-up on the commission’s recommendations – especially those that places limits on the 
power of the state. Thus the holistic approach to transitional justice that is recommended by the international 
human rights community and most scholars is not very likely to become a reality in Honduras. Based on 
Grodsky’s (2007: 296) suggestion that there needs to be a distinction between liberal and illiberal truth 
commissions, just as there is a distinction between liberal and illiberal democracies, and based on the 
findings made throughout the thesis, I argue that the CVR was an illiberal truth commission. The truth-
seeking process in Honduras emerged from a “particularly perverse situation in which political elites with 
blood on their hands may be willing to pursue transitional justice” (Grodsky 2007: 296), which, from the 
very start, obstructed its prospects for impacting positively on human rights in Honduras.   
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5 FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on the findings of the study, it is my assessment that the CVR due to significant methodology 
weaknesses, issues of legitimacy, and a challenging political context, is unlikely to contribute to an 
improvement of human rights in post-coup Honduras. I base my argument on the following findings: a) the 
Honduran truth-seeking process did not live up to international human rights obligations or the international 
standards for TCs, b) significant obstacles are present in Honduras that reduce the likeliness of the CVR 
making a difference for human rights in the country, and c) the Honduran government negatively influenced 
the CVR’s contribution to human rights. 
 
The CVR was compromised from the start, because it was established on the basis of international pressure, 
and did not derive from Honduran aspirations, and due to the Honduran government making unilateral 
decisions, leading to virtually no domestic support for the CVR. It is clear that the truth-seeking process 
failed to live up to international standards of national consultation, victim-centeredness, and transparency. 
The mandate was narrow and inflexible, with a misdirected focus on political circumstances of the coup 
rather than the gross human rights violations, and the commissioners were of questionable competence, 
independence and impartiality. The Lobo government demonstrated a lack of will to conduct a serious 
investigation that complied with international standards, and a weak follow-up record indicates a lack of 
interest on part of the government to implement the recommendations of the CVR, which otherwise to some 
extent reflected the state’s obligations to secure the right to truth, justice and reparation. 
 
Throughout the study, several obstacles have been identified for the CVR to have a positive effect on human 
rights. With regards to satisfying the right to the truth can be mentioned the classification of delicate 
documents, the refrainment from naming names, the focus on perpetrators, and an insecure setting that may 
have complicated the statement-taking process. Obstacles for satisfying the right to justice include the 
CVR’s refrainment from assigning responsibility in its report, restricted access to evidence, insufficient 
political will to prosecute, the Amnesty Decree, and a lack of independence of the legislative and judicial 
branches of government. Finally, with regards to the right to reparation, a significant obstacle is the financial 
strains that the government is under, partly as a consequence of the coup. Judging from these factors, there is 
little chance of the satisfaction of the right to truth, justice or reparation in Honduras.  
      The CVR does not appear likely to improve human rights via forward-looking measures either. Even 
though some follow-up has been made, the implementation of institutional reforms has been slow and weak, 
and lack of victim-centering, transparency, and national consultation makes it unlikely for the CVR fostering 
reconciliation of the Honduran people. To this day, no one has been brought to justice for the human rights 
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violations, nor has any reparation been provided to the victims. There is thus little indication that Hondurans 
are facing a less abusive future. 
 
Honduras is a country in dire need of reconciliation, as the country is severely polarized. This is clear from 
the reactions to the CVR and the fact that there are two TCs, which have not cooperated in any way. 
Officially acknowledging the victims for their suffering could be a way of moving forward. However, the 
state has shown no interest in such measures. On the contrary, all evidence points to the fact that the state is 
involved in the ongoing human rights violations, which hang as a dark cloud over the country.  
      I find Grodsky’s theory useful for explaining the way that the truth-seeking process played out. My final 
conclusion is that the CVR is unlikely to contribute to improved human rights in Honduras mainly because 
the Lobo government made sure that it would not. The CVR was established in a context of repressive rule, 
by the very persons who supported and enabled the coup. Incentivized by restoration of international 
recognition and the financial rewards that comes with it, the Lobo administration launched a weak and 
carefully controlled TC process – an illiberal TC –, which did not expose the powerful elites to the risk of 
losing influence. Thus, it is my assessment that the findings made in the study confirm the hypotheses that 
were presented in the introduction: that the CVR has not handled truth-seeking well enough to make a 
difference for human rights in the country, and that this was a circumstance that stemmed from the Honduran 
government’s desire to repress the population and stay in power.  
 
Honduras was not ready for a TC, because it was still living the coup. The obligation of a TC was premature, 
and the U.S. government and the OAS may have done the Honduran people a disservice by making it a 
priority. The conclusions from the case of Honduras should be cause for reconsideration on part of 
international actors of their support for TCs in the context of repressive rule. The fact that the TC method has 
become an increasingly common way of addressing a past of gross human rights violations makes it even 
more important to emphasize the problem. The study underlines the disappointing results truth-seeking can 
produce when the country is not ready for it, and stresses the importance of a more thorough assessment of 
the national context when supporting, and pressing for, a TC, in order to avoid the emergence of more 
illiberal TCs. 
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Appendix: Interview guide 
 
The following interview guide was used to interview two Honduran human rights defenders: Fabia 
Gutierrez, the president of the Honduran women’s organization: the Collective for Working Women of 
Honduras (COMUTRAH), and Zoila Lagos, the president of another Honduran women’s organization: the 
Association of Mutual Support between Women in Honduras (APOMUH). Both interviews were prepared 
by the author. The interview with Ms. Gutierrez was carried out on 31 January 2013 with the help of a fellow 
volunteer from the Danish Central America Committee upon her visit to Puerto Cortes, Honduras. The 
interview with Ms. Lagos was done via e-mail on 22 February 2013. 
 
1) In your view, what is the current state of human rights in Honduras? Is it worse, better, or the same as last 
year?  
 
2) How would you describe the situation in Honduras? Is it a conflict? Between whom? 
 
3) What do you think caused the violence that you – Hondurans – are currently experiencing? 
 
4) In your view, what are the most serious problems in Honduras, and who is responsible?  
 
5) Do you think that the human rights violations have intensified after June 28, 2009?  
 
6) Is it your perception that you are living under a repressive regime?  
 
7) In your opinion, has the truth about the coup d’état and the human rights violations been exposed? 
 
8) Do you know the official and governmental Truth and Reconciliation Commission?  
 
9) How did you come to know of this commission? 
 
10) What is your opinion of this commission? 
 
11) Do you think that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has made a difference for human rights?  
 
12) In your opinion, is it important that the truth is uncovered and that those who caused the conflict are 
made responsible?  
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13) Do you believe that the government of Pepe Lobo has a direct role in the human rights violations and the 
violence that marks the Honduran society in this moment?  
 
14) Do you know the True Commission, the alternative truth commission that has been established by civil 
society in Honduras?  
 
15) How did you come to know of this commission? 
 
16) What is your opinion of this commission? 
 
17) If you could tell your own truth to a truth commission, what would you accentuate? 
 
18) What is missing in order for you to feel that justice has been done for the coup d’état and the human 
rights violations? 
 
19) What do you think is missing to end the violence and conflict in your country? 
